holding default judgment principles govern a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment and for leave to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
How later courts described this case
- holding default judgment principles govern a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment and for leave to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
- noting that a state does not violate equal protection by applying different criminal justice and sentencing schemes to persons who committed their crimes at different times
- defining culpability, in the context of a motion for relief from a default judgment, as “an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [the party’s] conduct on those proceedings”
- holding standard applies to all Rule 60(b)(1) motions, regardless of whether the challenged judgment is a default judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ holding that counsel committed “excusable neglect” in failing to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report in this case. Counsel had asked for an extension of time for thirty days beyond the ten-day period prescribed for such objections. The court actually granted an additional thirty-nine days, to April 25.
Counsel, now having had forty-nine days since the filing of the magistrate judge’s report, waited until the forty-eighth day to ask for an additional twenty-one day extension.
Under these circumstances, waiting until the next to the last day to file the extension was virtually defying the judge’s right to rule on the motion. The circumstances at issue here, while certainly trying, are in no way out of the ordinary for legal practice. Other professional and personal commitments, which did not arise at the last moment, are part and parcel of doing business as a lawyer. The reasons relied on by my colleagues for finding this neglect excusable would be present in very many cases before our court. By waiting until the end of the extended period to file a request for yet another extension, counsel insured that the judge would have no choice between dismissing the case, with the harsh consequences that are noted in the opinion, and acceding to counsel’s request, whatever its merits. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the test of United Coin Meter and of Weiss has been met and that counsel’s actions show carelessness and/or negligence in dealing with the time given him by the court’s initial extension of time.
I therefore respectfully dissent.