explaining that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, an affidavit “must contain a statement about some of the underlying circumstances indicating the informant was credible or that his information was reliable” (quoting United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1999))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, an affidavit “must contain a statement about some of the underlying circumstances indicating the informant was credible or that his information was reliable” (quoting United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1999))
- finding the affidavit did not show the veracity of an anonymous tipster’s statements because it did not provide any background information on or basis for believing the tipster, and also failed to describe any track record of accurate tips previously provided
- noting that even where "the likely duration of th[e] evidence is long," evidence may still be stale if enough time has passed between the tip and execution of the warrant, and expressing concern about the staleness of a two-month-old tip that stacks of money were being stored in a residence
- noting that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, an affidavit “must contain a statement about some of the underlying circumstances indicating the informant was credible or that his information was reliable” (quoting United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1999))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. McIntosh, 109 F. App'x 65 (2004)
Helton, however, is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
SILER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. For purposes of this dissent, I assume, without deciding, that the affidavit for the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, as the majority has declared. That was also the conclusion of the district court. However, I would affirm the conclusion by the district court and the magistrate judge that the good-faith rule from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), requires that the search of the premises at 723 N. Harrison Street in Saginaw, Michigan, be upheld.
As recited by the majority, the affidavit filed by FBI Special Agent Robert Howard was very extensive, consisting of twenty-seven pages and sixty-four paragraphs. Admittedly, some of the detail did not add much. However, there was a significant amount of information about telephone calls and the informant’s having seen “stacks” of money in the house in October, two months prior to the search. That informant also had been told by Jimmia Green that the money belonged to Dino Peterson and that Green was storing it for Peterson because she had no criminal record. The majority finds fault with this information from the informant listed as FBI-A, because there was no background data about that informant. The majority also finds fault with the information about the “stacks” of money because the informant did not say in what rooms the stacks *826 were located, nor the amount of stacks, nor whether the stacks were on the floor or in the closet. However, from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), we know that “line-byline scrutiny [is] ... inappropriate in reviewing [a] magistrate’s decisions.” Id. at 246 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2317 . We are not to have a “grudging or negative attitude ... toward warrants.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). As we more recently stated in United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir.2000)(ew banc), “The Court stressed that a hypertechnical critique of warrants would only, in the end, encourage warrantless searches.... ” Thus, “[t]he affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not what it lacks, or what a critic might say should have been added.” Id. at 974 . Therefore, although we can find instances within the affidavit in this case where more detail could have been supplied, we should look at the affidavit and the warrant in accordance with Leon, 468 U.S. at 905 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 .
The defendant claims that Leon is not applicable because the belief by the officer that probable cause existed is completely unreasonable. As in Leon , the application for the warrant here was supported by much more than a “bare bones” affidavit. It was certainly reasonable enough for the magistrate judge to find that there was probable cause, and it was reasonable enough for the district court to find that the officers did not act unreasonably in relying upon it in this case. In United States v. Czuprynski, 46 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir.1995)(en banc), we held that the Leon good-faith exception applied to uphold that warrant. Although the facts in Czupryn-ski are not the same as those in the present case, I would still find that there is a good-faith exception under Leon , given the totality of the circumstances, and affirm the decision of the district court.
I would also affirm the decision of the district court in denying a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), as the defendant did not make a sufficient showing for such a hearing.