concluding that the adoption of the state-created-danger doctrine in six circuits was insufficient to create a robust consensus because the circuits were not unanimous in defining the doctrine’s its “contours” or applying it “to a factual context similar to that of the instant case”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the adoption of the state-created-danger doctrine in six circuits was insufficient to create a robust consensus because the circuits were not unanimous in defining the doctrine’s its “contours” or applying it “to a factual context similar to that of the instant case”
- holding that a right may be clearly established based on controlling authority — Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit case law — or " ‘a consensus of cases of persuasive authority' " in other circuits (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999))
- holding that “neither this court nor the Supreme Court has yet determined whether a citizen has a constitutional right to be free from state-created dangers” and because the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary elements of the theory it would not apply even if available
- concluding that, although three other circuits recognized constitutional right, their differing "mental state" requirements did not fairly warn government official of what conduct would contravene that right
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment only.
See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir.1995)(en banc)(“In sum, we hold that a ‘special relationship’ arises between a person and the state only when this person is involuntarily confined against his will through the affirmative exercise of state power. Absent this ‘special relationship,’ the state has no duty to protect nor liability from failing to protect a person under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from violence at the hands of a private actor.” (emphasis added)).