The opinion
COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Only one legal question is at issue here: whether, as set forth in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge to the scheduling of his parole hearing. I conclude that the writ of habeas corpus does not provide the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge and, for that reason, he may bring a § 1983 action.
The writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for challenges that necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646, 648 , 117 S.Ct. 1584 , 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (D.C.Cir.1998); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997). Here, petitioner appeals only the scheduling of his release hearing. Neither outcome of that decision' — -rescheduling the hearing or *667 not rescheduling the hearing — necessarily implies the invalidity of petitioner’s continued confinement. Thus, because petitioner does not challenge a release decision, the writ of habeas corpus is not petitioner’s exclusive remedy and he may challenge it through a § 1983 action. For this reason, I concur in reversing the district court’s dismissal.