concluding that a domestic relations order providing for payment to a deceased former spouse was not qualifiable because a “deceased spouse” was not included within the term “former spouse”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a domestic relations order providing for payment to a deceased former spouse was not qualifiable because a “deceased spouse” was not included within the term “former spouse”
- holding that the language of the court order that was before it “conflicts with ERISA’s anti-alienation provision and is therefore pre-empt-ed”
- holding that ERISA preempted a state court order awarding spousal interest in an employee's pension proceeds
- holding that ERISA’s surviving spouse annuity preempts a testamentary transfer
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting.
The majority reaches its holding by relying on our decision in Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.1991), and two recent Supreme Court decisions, Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 , 117 S.Ct. 1754 , 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997) and Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001). The District Court, however, already properly distinguished Ablamis and Boggs , and Egelhoff is likewise distinguishable.
In each of these three cases, a plan participant or beneficiary, upon the death of their spouse, suddenly saw their interest in benefits they expected at that time divested and defeated by state law. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1452 ; Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836-37 , 117 S.Ct. 1754 ; Egelhoff, 121 S.Ct. at 1325-26 . The circumstances in the present case are different. Neither when Anna died nor at any later point in time did California state law suddenly divest Alfred of any benefits he expected at that time. On the contrary, Alfred had long ago given up any expectation in these benefits when he stipulated to the divorce settlement order explicitly granting Anna 47.07% of the benefits “for as long as they are payable to or on behalf of’ Alfred. Under these circumstances, the majority’s holding not only does not advance the purpose of ERISA’s anti-alienation clause to “guarantee that retirement funds are there when a plan’s participants and beneficiaries expect them.” Boggs, 520 U.S. at 852 , 117 S.Ct. 1754 . The majority’s holding also undermines community property law’s “commitment to the equality of husband and wife and ... the real partnership inherent in the marital relationship.” Id. at 840 , 117 S.Ct. 1754 .
I respectfully dissent.