noting that “[m]arket definition 38 No. 24-2111 is a highly fact-based analysis that generally requires discov- ery”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “[m]arket definition 38 No. 24-2111 is a highly fact-based analysis that generally requires discov- ery”
- “Market definition is a highly fact-based analysis that generally requires discovery. Here, however, definition of the relevant market requires relatively little factual analysis.” (citations omitted)
- emphasizing that “[m]arket definition is a highly fact-based analysis that generally requires discovery”
- affirming dismissal of complaint that failed to properly allege, inter alia, product market
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Judge Merritt’s excellent discussion of the issues in this controversy leaves little requirement for any extended discourse. I write concerning the jurisdictional issue, and I fully concur in the conclusion that “the district court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the Foundation to bring its declaratory judgment claim.” I do not find the Foundation’s decision to bring this action in the Western District of Michigan promptly after issuing its final decision to be troubling. Counsel for the College had repeatedly warned of legal action, and the nature of the Foundation’s structure and operations behooved it to pursue a legal disposition of its rights in a “home” court rather than in some distant forum. The College had every opportunity to challenge jurisdiction and venue if it chose to do so.
I would emphasize also that:
In reviewing an accrediting association’s decision to withdraw a member’s accreditation, the courts have accorded the association’s determination great deference. Medical Inst. of Minnesota, 817 F.2d at 1314; Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass’n of Colleges and Secondary Sch., 432 F.2d 650, 657 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 , 91 S.Ct. 367 , 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970). Courts give accrediting associations such deference because of the professional judgment these associations must necessarily employ in making accreditation decisions. In considering the substance of accrediting agencies’ rules, courts have recognized that “[t]he standards of accreditation are not guides for the layman but for professionals in the field of education.” Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass’n of College and Secondary Sch., 271 F.Supp. 65, 73 (N.D.Ill.1967). Consequently, courts are not free to conduct a de novo review or to substitute their judgment for the professional judgment of the educators involved in the accreditation process.
Wilfred Acad. of Hair & Beauty Culture v. Southern Ass’n of Coll. & Schs., 957 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1992).
Even without this “great deference” due plaintiff arising out of its professional judgment, the record fully supports the decision of Judge Merritt and affirming the district court.