explaining that in calculating pre-judgment interest in ERISA cases, courts disfavor “simply adopting state law interest rates” because “ERISA is not an area primarily of state concern”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that in calculating pre-judgment interest in ERISA cases, courts disfavor “simply adopting state law interest rates” because “ERISA is not an area primarily of state concern”
- treating claims formally but mistakenly brought under the Internal Revenue Code as having been brought under ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132
- finding it appropriate to consider an unbriefed issue that involved pure questions of law
- upholding district court’s award of the higher of the § 1961(a) rate or “the rate of return actually earned on the principal amount of the underpayment during the prejudgment period”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur entirely with my colleague, Judge Nelson, through part II.B of his opinion. I would hold, however, that we should adhere to our usual procedure and deem that plaintiffs have waived any anti-cutback argument in this appeal under Brindley v. McCullen, 61 F.3d 507 (6th Cir.1995); see also Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir.1986). This case is not about loss of vested benefits under our ruling as to pre-December 18, 1996 provisions of the plan and amended plans. TRW has, indeed, dealt generously with its employees, and I would not stretch our procedures to consider that which plaintiffs have failed adequately to argue or brief. I think that'the rationale to reverse is supported by the effect of the IRS’ approval or “favorable ‘determination letter’ ” issued with respect to the TRW plan, amended effective January 1,1989.
In general, I deem Costantino not controlling under the differing facts and circumstances of this case. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the post-amendment claim that they assert.
I dissent with respect to the award of prejudgment interest, particularly in view of the generous awards heretofore ordered by this court as to retirement benefits deemed to be accrued. In the first place, “ERISA does not mandate the award of prejudgment interest to prevailing plan participants.” Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir.1998). It may be awarded at the reasonable discretion of the district judge. See id. The purpose of any such award is not to punish the employer. See id. at 617 . I would hold that plaintiffs are more than adequately compensated by award under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 , and not some other rate. See Ford, 154 F.3d at 619 . Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228 (7th Cir.1990), cited as support for the majority’s prejudgment interest decision, is, in my view, readily distinguishable. See Marshall v. Security State Bank of Hamilton (In re Marshall), 970 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir.1992) (distinguishing Lorenzen). It was a split decision and there was a strong overtone of wrongdoing by the employer in that case, unlike TRW’s role in the instant case. The Lorenzen court was particularly concerned about the welfare and need for “full compensation of the victim” and his widow. I would, accordingly, conclude that awarding any prejudgment interest beyond that called for in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 was an abuse of discretion.