finding direct evidence of discrimination from witness testimony that a supervisor stated he would not promote plaintiff because she was a woman and did not want her handling the “hot fine” because “women were not mechanically inclined”
How later courts described this case
- finding direct evidence of discrimination from witness testimony that a supervisor stated he would not promote plaintiff because she was a woman and did not want her handling the “hot fine” because “women were not mechanically inclined”
- reversing summary judgment for employer based on finding that fellow employee’s unrefuted testimony that supervisor stated that he would not promote plaintiff because she was a woman was sufficient direct evi dence of discriminatory animus to raise factual dispute
- finding that “the elements and legal standards for establishing unlawful sex discrimination are the same under Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.02 and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2”
- noting that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the elements of Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.02(A) are the same as those under Title VII
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I do not object to this cause being remanded to the district court in order to allow it to analyze plaintiffs direct evidence of discrimination, I write separately in order to stress that the district court remains free to entertain a subsequent motion for summary judgment after it has performed this analysis.
It seems to me that the majority implies that, once a plaintiff has come forward with direct evidence of discrimination, a defendant is precluded from presenting a legitimate reason for its employment decision. This is not the case. While a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting direct evidence of intentional discrimination by the defendant, Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995), this merely shifts the burden to the employer to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that its actions were taken for legitimate nondiseriminatory reasons. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the employer provides a well-supported explanation, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 . The plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against her. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
Based upon the evidence submitted to this court, I believe that defendant U-Haul came forward with a well-supported explanation for the adverse employment actions taken against plaintiff. Specifically, it strikes me as inconceivable that this court would expect an employer to promote (or retain) an employee whose mismanagement of her financial responsibilities resulted in significant losses to the employer. Nor do I find it “suspicious” that U-Haul dismissed plaintiff despite her record of promotions and pay raises. The extent of plaintiffs financial mismanagement came gradually to light; furthermore, the promotion that she sought went to a better qualified individual. The fact that the district court analyzed plaintiffs evidence as circumstantial rather than direct makes no difference in evaluating defendant’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its employment actions. As just noted, direct evidence of discrimination merely suffices to establish a prima facie case, which shifts the burden of production to the employer to come forward with a non-pretextual reason for its decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 . However, the burden of persuasion ultimately rests with plaintiff. Given the evidence presented to this court, it strikes me as unlikely that plaintiff will be able to meet this burden.
Accordingly, I view our decision to remand this action somewhat expansively. Except that the district court should consider that plaintiff presented direct evidence of discrimination, it remains free to revisit the Title VII burden-shifting scheme in its entirety, including the nondiscriminatory explanation offered by U-Haul for its decision.