explaining that in McKinney, the plaintiff “did not have a viable federal due process claim” because state law “provided an adequate remedy for the type of procedural deprivation [he] claimed to have suffered, even though he had not taken advantage of that state remedy.” (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1561–65)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that in McKinney, the plaintiff “did not have a viable federal due process claim” because state law “provided an adequate remedy for the type of procedural deprivation [he] claimed to have suffered, even though he had not taken advantage of that state remedy.” (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1561–65)
- explaining that if a state law remedy exists, a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction to entertain the state claim, and, accordingly, demonstrating that a state remedy must be grounded in state law
- concluding that plaintiffs failure to pursue state law claim is not dispositive; Fourteenth Amendment only requires that plaintiffs have opportunity to pursue relief in state courts
- stating in dicta that exhaustion and ripeness are not the doctrines in play in assessing whether a procedural due process claim has been stated
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the district court’s conclusion that removal of the procedural due-process claim was improper while the plaintiffs were in the midst of seeking a remedy in state court was not a jurisdictional determination, but rather, a determination that the plaintiffs had not stated an actionable procedural due-process claim on the merits in accordance with McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). Of course, I agree with the majority’s discussion of McKinney , but I think it is that analysis which undergirds the district court’s decision, even though it was not perfectly articulated in the district court order. I would hold that the district court’s order is reviewable by us on appeal.
In its original order, the district court stated the claim was not properly in its *1303 court and observed that plaintiff was in pursuit of a post-deprivation remedy in state court at the time the suit was removed. The juxtaposition of these two facts is not evidence that the district court read into the McKinney rule a ripeness or exhaustion requirement. Instead, it is an acknowledgment that an adequate state remedy exists. The availability of the state procedure at the time of the pleading defeats the claim even if plaintiffs had not been “in pursuit” through that procedure. The district court’s clarifying order supports this reading. The court “dismissed” plaintiffs’ claim. In my judgment, the district court’s “remand” of the procedural due process claim along with the plaintiffs’ state law claims was nothing more than a reflection that if plaintiff ever could assert a procedural due process claim in keeping with the McKinney rule, it could be asserted in state court, and was not a judgment based on ripeness or exhaustion. I would credit the district court with a proper understanding of McKinney and interpret its less than clear order accordingly. In effect, the district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, a decision on the merits reviewable on this appeal, which I would affirm.