explaining that “decisions about cutting or adding athletic programs are based on a consideration of many factors including: the total size of the athletic department ... and distribution of programs between men and women”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “decisions about cutting or adding athletic programs are based on a consideration of many factors including: the total size of the athletic department ... and distribution of programs between men and women”
- holding that university’s elimination of men’s soccer and men’s wrestling teams “is not a violation of Title IX as long as men’s participation in athletics continues to be ‘substantially proportionate’ to their enrollment”
- rejecting equal protection challenge and holding that “[t]he elimination of sex-based discrimination in federally-funded educational institutions is an important government objective, and the actions of Illinois State University in eliminating the men’s soccer and men’s wrestling programs were substantially related to that objective”
- noting that it was undisputed that the university achieved substantial proportionality between men’s enrollment and men’s participation in athletics, where the number of male athletes was within three percentage points of enrollment following the elimination of men’s soccer and wrestling
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d 648 (2010)
198 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d 648
The opinion
concurring.
I fully join in this well-reasoned opinion, and only expand on a thought already expressed.
*642 The ideal situation, though not anticipated as a practical matter, might nevertheless sometime surprisingly arise; that would be where a university has the money and the desire to accommodate all its students of either sex who have the interest and sports ability to be competitive. Even if not competitive on a national level, it should suffice to be competitive at least at conference level. The extra sports funding needed may not show up in the budget. However, a school recognizing the many advantages of a broad sports program might be able to tighten up less important aspects of its budget in order to help fund its athletic programs for eligible students of both sexes. The legislature, realizing the situation, might also respond favorably. Under those conditions, I would expect the school not to be curtailed in its sports programs because of a proportionality formula which, in that situation, would be irrelevant. Student athletes would neither be helped nor hindered by the proportionality formula. Participation is more important than percentages.
One point concerning the financial aspect of this case does concern me. In the school’s brief, reference is made to “Appellants’ implication” that the Athletic Department would have $400,000 in unexpected revenues due to pending legislation which was awaiting the Governor’s signature. Plaintiffs argued that, because of the predicted influx of money, this case is distinguished from Kelley in that it was not based on both budgetary and gender considerations, but solely upon gender. Plaintiffs asserted that, if received, the $400,000 would have provided sufficient funds to maintain the men’s soccer and wrestling teams and add female sports programs. The school does not directly deny that the sum may have, at some point, become available to the Athletic Department. The school’s answer is merely that there is nothing in the record about it. As we cannot go outside the record, I am willing to assume that the school is not purposely avoiding a direct answer. However, if that extra money was, in fact, available, I would not decide this case on summary judgment but would send it back for exploration of the Athletic Department’s financial situation.