stating that the “intent” of the False Claims Act 2 See supra, note 1. 16 Case: 13-20182 Document: 00512534038 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/17/2014 No. 13-20182 is “to encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud against the government “to bring such information forward at the earliest possible time and to discourage persons with relevant information from remaining silent” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “intent” of the False Claims Act 2 See supra, note 1. 16 Case: 13-20182 Document: 00512534038 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/17/2014 No. 13-20182 is “to encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud against the government “to bring such information forward at the earliest possible time and to discourage persons with relevant information from remaining silent” (citation omitted)
- stating that the “intent” of the False Claims Act is “to encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud against the government to bring such information forward at the earliest possible time and to discourage persons with relevant information from remaining silent” (citation omitted)
- observing that FCA was intended to encourage private individuals who are aware of fraud against the government “to bring such information forward at the earliest possible time and to discourage persons with relevant information from remaining silent.”
- holding that disclosure to a government official “authorized to act for or to represent the community on behalf of government can be understood as public disclosure”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907 (2009)
166 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that material theoretically available upon the public's request was not publicly disclosed within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A)), overruled on other grounds by Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, 570 F.3d 907
The opinion
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the court’s conclusion that Mathews’ fraud allegations were *867 based upon publicly disclosed information within the meaning of the statute, I believe this case can be resolved on a narrower ground than that adopted by the court. Even if we were to accept Mathews’ view that her allegations were publicly disclosed when she testified to them in the prior lawsuit, she still does not qualify as an “original source” as defined by the False Claims Act. Under the Act, an “original source” is “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action....” 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B). Mathews argues that her knowledge of the Bank’s fraud was direct and independent because she was in a unique position to put two and two together, so to speak, and thereby reveal the otherwise hidden pattern of fraud by the Bank. As the majority also acknowledges, ante at 864-65, it is possible that a would-be whistleblower, acting much as Mathews has here, could put together facts known only to her with other information and reveal a pattern of fraud sufficiently complex as to meet the direct and independent knowledge requirements.
At best, however, this means only that Mathews could satisfy the “direct and independent knowledge” half of the original source definition. She must still demonstrate that she voluntarily provided that information to the government before filing her action, and this she has not done. The voluntary disclosure requirement in § 3730(e)(4)(B) is distinct from the requirement in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(2) that a qui tam plaintiff provide the government with a copy of her complaint so that the government can decide whether to proceed with the action on its own behalf. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 123 F.3d 935 , 942 (6th Cir.1997). As the court’s opinion points out, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Mathews took any steps to inform the government of her allegations prior to filing a complaint. In my view, this is enough to require us to affirm the judgment of the district court, and I would therefore not reach the questions of the different ways in which public disclosure might occur or what it means for a claim to be based upon publicly disclosed information. I therefore concur in the judgment of the court.