holding that “receipts” referred’to money actually received at the time it was received and therefore, that the accrual method of accounting, which allocated advance ticket sales to the month for which tickets were sold rather than the month when the ticket was actually sold, could not be used to satisfy “receipts” requirement of § 213(a)(3)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “receipts” referred’to money actually received at the time it was received and therefore, that the accrual method of accounting, which allocated advance ticket sales to the month for which tickets were sold rather than the month when the ticket was actually sold, could not be used to satisfy “receipts” requirement of § 213(a)(3)
- holding that a court may not examine “legislative history to contravene the clear and unambiguous language of [a] statute”
- "[W]e c[an]not look to the legislative history to contravene the clear and unambiguous language of the statute."
- “The country club’s ability to satisfy the receipts test in [the statute] was not necessary to the holding in Brock [v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.1987) ], which means that the part of the opinion discussing the receipts test is dicta.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned conclusion that the district court did not err in deciding that the Cincinnati Reds baseball franchise does not qualify as a seasonal entertainment establishment under the FLSA, and is not, therefore, exempt from the statute pursuant to § 213(a)(3)(B). The majority correctly concludes that the clear and unambiguous language of § 213(a)(3)(B) requires us to look at a seasonal entertainment establishment’s receipts, and not its income or its accounting method, in determining whether the Reds falls within that exception. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s characterization of the result in this ease being “illogical” and “counterin-tuitive.”
I believe that we are presented with a difficult question because Congress has provided us with so little guidance in § 213(a)(3)(B)’s legislative history. The majority correctly states that the FLSA is a broad remedial statute, and that its exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960); Salyer v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 83 F.3d 784, 786 (6th Cir.1996). Congress certainly must have known that nearly all businesses operate under the accrual method of accounting; thus, it likely would have chosen to use “income” rather than “receipts” if it had desired to create a broader exception for seasonal amusement establishments in § 213(a)(3)(B). For whatever reason, Congress, consciously decided to fore-go using terms such as “income when earned” or “receipts which accrue,” and instead, chose the word “receipts.” Therefore, I agree with the majority that the plain meaning of § 213(a)(3)(B)’s language requires us to analyze the Reds’ “receipts” in determining whether the Reds fall within § 213(a)(3)(B)’s exemption.
I respectfully disagree, however, that holding the Reds to this plain meaning interpretation of § 213(a)(3)(B) leads to an illogical or counterintuitive result. Although the accrual method of accounting more accurately matches up the Reds’ revenues with its expenses, I would find it problematic to insulate the Reds from the FLSA’s overtime requirements merely because it does not record its off-season revenue as income until its actual games are played from April through October. The majority emphasizes that the Reds keep season ticket revenues paid by its ticket holders in a separate bank account, and that the Reds must refund the money to the ticket holder if the game is not played (e.g., during a player strike). However, I have no doubt that the Reds receive substantial interest or similar revenue on those season ticket revenues while those funds are held in a separate bank account. Thus, I believe that it is quite logical that Congress chose not to exempt an organization like the Reds from paying an employee like Daisy S. Pearl an additional $2.75 per hour above her regular rate of $5.50 per hour for overtime hours, because the Reds clearly benefit financially by receiving significant amounts of its revenue in the off-season. Accordingly, the “receipts” test of § 213(a)(3)(B) does not need to be “corrected” or “perfected” by this court because I believe Congress meant what *833 it said and said what it meant: a business operation like the Reds cannot insulate itself from the FLSA’s overtime requirements if it enjoys the benefit of receiving substantial amounts of revenue during the off-season months.