holding that the purpose of the "indicia of membership" test is to determine whether the "nature of the relationship between the [organization] and the relevant interests of [its non-members] satisfie[s] the goals of the constitutional standing requirement"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the purpose of the "indicia of membership" test is to determine whether the "nature of the relationship between the [organization] and the relevant interests of [its non-members] satisfie[s] the goals of the constitutional standing requirement"
- stating that in Hunt, the Supreme Court performed a functional analysis to determine whether an association whose constituents were not members in the traditional sense nevertheless had standing to sue on their behalf
- organization could assert associational standing in the absence of legal members under applicable corporation law where members voluntarily associated with the organization and the lawsuit clearly fell within the organization’s central purpose and the scope of reasons individuals joined the organization; the court explicitly assumed voting rights were a necessary element of indicia of membership, however, it did not examine too closely the relationship between voting rights and the standing witnesses in *638 that case
- applying Hunt’s, “indicia of membership” test where District of Columbia nonprofit organization had no members under the corporate laws of the District of Columbia
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because FOE did not have the requisite individual members in order to qualify for asspciational standing, I respectfully dissent.
The central contention made by FOE, and the one upon which the majority relies, is that Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977), controls. But, Hunt concerned a state agency that was acting similar to a trade association; unlike FOE, it had no mechanism to establish “members” in the traditional sense. Faced with this, the Supreme Court looked to the “indicia of membership” because “[u]nder the circumstances presented here,, it would exalt form over substance to differentiate between the [state agency] and a traditional trade associa-tion....” Id. at 345 , 97 S.Ct. at 2442 (emphasis added).
The majority expands Hunt to cover nonprofit corporations, pointing to Sierra Ass’n for Environment v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 744 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.1984). However, that case involved whether the plaintiff had the capacity to sue under Fed. R.CrvP. 17(b)(1); it has little or no bearing on whether the laws regulating nonprofit corporate membership would affect assoeiational standing.
The other, non-binding, authority upon which the majority relies is Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.1997). The portion of Magnesium Elektron that deals with the expansion of Hunt is relegated to two sentences and it does not address the issue presented here: what role by-laws and state law should play in determining nonprofit corporate membership; what the result should' be when, as here, procedures for membership are not established or followed; and why Hunt should apply to such corporations.
*830 There are. sound reasons not to extend Hunt to nonprofit corporations. In Hunt , the Court’s extension of the associational standing doctrine was from a trade association to a state agency that had an established constituency through state enabling legislation. The Court stated: “The only question presented, therefore, is whether, on this record, the Commission’s status as a state agency, rather than a traditional voluntary membership organization, precludes it from asserting the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealers who form its constituency.” 432 U.S. at 344 , 97 S.Ct. at 2442 (emphasis added).
This extension of “membership” from an association to a certain type of state agency does not as a matter of logic or policy, much less law, continue on to a nonprofit corporation. Associations are far more loosely organized and are not required to follow certain formalities because they do not receive the many benefits of corporate status. A nonprofit corporation, which has a method for selecting its members according to its bylaws and state law, but which has failed to follow this method, should not be entitled to associational standing with respect to persons who are, therefore, non-members, simply because, in certain situations, it may choose to assert these individuals’ “indicia of membership”. (This principle, of course, would not operate in reverse: an action against an individual who is not a member of such a corporation could not expose the corporation to liability. Needless to say, limiting liability is a primary reason for forming such a corporation, with procedures for determining who is, and who is not, a member.)
It is unnecessary to engage in the difficult, and somewhat speculative, application of the “indicia of membership” test when a nonprofit corporation has, or at least should have, a method with which it can clearly, readily, and easily establish its membership. The difficulties associated with this indicia test are demonstrated by the facts presented in this case. Two of FÓE’s “members” do not appear to have joined until after the last lawsuit in this ease was filed. Another’s membership is founded on a surprise gift donation on her behalf by another individual, five years prior to the lawsuit. Finding membership based upon these facts is troublesome and most unnecessary.
In response to the quite legitimate concerns expressed by the majority of elevating form over substance, I note the substantial constitutional requirements underpinning this more limited, prudential view of assoeia-tional standing. Limiting Hunt is more than an exercise in formalism or line-drawing; the “indicia of membership” test was a means to allow an entity, with certain membership characteristics, to have standing when, under a traditional view, it otherwise could not. As stated, the same is not true of a nonprofit corporation such as FOE.
Obviously, the Article III “case or controversy” requirement serves many salutary purposes. Not the least of these is ensuring, as the majority notes, that a party has a stake in the outcome; this avoids, among other things, frivolous actions, unreasonable refusals to settle, and proscribed advisory opinions. Extending the “indicia of membership” test to cover persons who could — and should — have been made members by a nonprofit corporation pushes associational standing to a point beyond the “case or controversy” requirements and relieves the plaintiff of some of its Article III standing burden.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the district court held correctly that FOE lacked associational standing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.