holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in entering summary judgment for defendant, despite the defendant’s alleged lack of response to plaintiffs discovery requests, where plaintiff filed motion to compel three months after close of discovery and three weeks after motion for summary judgment was filed
How later courts described this case
- holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in entering summary judgment for defendant, despite the defendant’s alleged lack of response to plaintiffs discovery requests, where plaintiff filed motion to compel three months after close of discovery and three weeks after motion for summary judgment was filed
- holding that out-of-court statements about an employee were not hearsay because the question was not whether the statements were true, but whether the supervisor had an “honest belief” that the statements were true
- holding that out-of-court statements concerning an employee’s performance problems did not constitute inadmissible hearsay because they went to the issue of the employer’s honest belief concerning such problems.
- holding that out-of-court statements concerning an employee’s performance problems were not hearsay because they went to the issue of the employer’s “honest belief” concerning such problems
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur with the majority’s result. I do not join the opinion, however, because I do not believe that this was the easy, almost frivolous case that the majority makes it out to be. Because this ease was presented at the summary judgment stage, I saw it as a difficult case, even though in the end I agree that Ms. Brill did not present sufficient evidence to create any genuine issues of fact that merit a trial. I am also concerned that the majority’s discussion (actually dicta) dismisses the possibility that certain circumstances could ever amount to discrimination or sexual harassment, when the only conclusion necessary to the disposition of the appeal is that the facts in this case did not present a genuine question for trial. One example, although not the only one, is the majority’s suggestion that because an alleged harasser’s remarks are addressed to someone else, although made in the plaintiffs presence and within her hearing, they cannot be considered sexual harassment of the plaintiff. Supra at 1274. It seems clear to me that sexual remarks, even though addressed to another, potentially could create a hostile work environment for those who hear them. In my view, the incidents described by Ms. Brill did not amount to sexual harassment, not because the remarks were addressed to someone else in Ms. Brill’s presence and within her hearing, but because they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to sexual harassment under the law of this circuit.