explaining that courts must defer to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA if the Board’s construction is a reasonable one
How later courts described this case
- explaining that courts must defer to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA if the Board’s construction is a reasonable one
- deferring to the Board’s definition of “labor organization,” but noting difference in deference given to Board’s reasonable interpretation of the NLRA as opposed to its interpretation of Supreme Court precedent construing the Act
- applying Lechmere to handbilling by non-employee union representatives urging a boycott of a nonunion store at a strip mall
- applying Chevron to NLRB interpretations of the NLRA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result only.
Because I believe that the result reached in this ease no longer reflects congressional intent, it is with the greatest of reluctance that I concur. But for a presidential veto of amendatory legislation passed by Congress, what Webeor attempted to do here would be viewed against the backdrop of legislation more hospitable to concepts like plant councils.
In a similar vein, gratuitous on my part though it may be, I believe that the Board exceeded its authority when it ordered a new election. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the rejection of the union in the first election represented other than the clear will of a majority of the employees. The Plant Council at issue here was not even formed until after the election.
I realize, of course, that this issue is not now before us, and so I agree that we must enforce the Board’s order.