holding that gender discrimination, “when practiced by those exercising authority in the name of a public official [an executive assistant to the County Commissioner], is as much a matter of public concern as racial discrimination practiced under similar circumstances” and speech bringing to light “actual wrongdoing on the part of one exercising public authority” is relevant to the public
How later courts described this case
- holding that gender discrimination, “when practiced by those exercising authority in the name of a public official [an executive assistant to the County Commissioner], is as much a matter of public concern as racial discrimination practiced under similar circumstances” and speech bringing to light “actual wrongdoing on the part of one exercising public authority” is relevant to the public
- finding that defendant’s affirmative recognition that “complaints about sexual harassment were important to its ability to serve the public ... [constituted] an ac-knowledgement ... that communications in the manner and place of [plaintiffs] do not pose an undue threat of disruption”
- concluding that, even though there was “no evidence” that those who took adverse action had knowledge of plaintiffs complaint, summary judgment was inappropriate because there was circumstantial evidence raising an inference of knowledge
- holding that Plaintiff's first amendment retaliation claim precluded summary judgment because it created a factual issue even where the assertion of a non-retaliatory reason would have justified the termination of Plaintiff’s employment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BECKER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join in the majority’s opinion with the understanding that, under its rendering of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), in part III, it has not created anything close to a per se rule under which reports of sexual harassment will always constitute public concern speech. It seems to me that there will be many complaints of sexual harassment, about more aggravated conduct than that described in footnote 4 of the opinion, which will not qualify as matters of public concern.and with respect to which summary judgment for the defendant will be appropriate. This will include cases where the offender is a non-supervisory co-worker and the incident is more than “isolated,” though neither egregious nor repeated with great frequency; where the incident is not known to the “powers that be”; where, even if a; supervispr is involved, the incident is minor or questionable; where the motive or credibility of the complainant is significantly in doubt; or where a combination of these factors is at work. Under the majority’s approach, the opposite result might attain, incorrectly I submit.
I am satisfied that the record in the case at bar supports the denial of summary judgment, though hot by much. I note in this regard Azzaro’s delayed and offhand non-report to Fox which became a “report” to Sirabella only in the context of the political crossfire in which she became caught when Hohman sought to use her report to combat his dwindling influence with Foerster. Indeed, the record is far from clear that she was not targeted for dismissal because of possible support for Brimmeier, see Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96 (3d Cir.1996), rather than her non-complaint of sexual harassment.
Judges SCIRICA, ROTH and ALITO join in this opinion.