concluding that a doctor was entitled to qualified immunity where he “determined, pursuant to and consistent with accepted professional judgment, that it was in Hogan’s medical interest to receive the one-time dose of Thorazine [against his will] in order to protect Hogan from imminent, self-inflicted harm” (internal citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a doctor was entitled to qualified immunity where he “determined, pursuant to and consistent with accepted professional judgment, that it was in Hogan’s medical interest to receive the one-time dose of Thorazine [against his will] in order to protect Hogan from imminent, self-inflicted harm” (internal citation omitted)
- finding no due process violation because the doctor, “consistent with accepted professional judgment [decided] that it was in [the inmate’s] medical interest to receive the one-time dose of [antipsychotic] in order to protect [the inmate] from imminent, self-inflicted harm.”
- concluding if prison doctor "had not ordered the single dose of Thorazine" to mentally deteriorating prisoner "it is not unlikely that [doctor] would now be facing a lawsuit by [prisoner] claiming that he was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs"
- holding that Harper allows prison officials to dispense with minimum Due Process requirements during emergencies in order to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment.
As the majority acknowledges, the “sole question before us ... is whether Dr. Carter violated clearly established law when, in response to the nurse’s call during the early morning hours of September 21 informing him that Hogan was in jeopardy of injuring himself, he ordered that Hogan be administered the single emergency dose of Thorazine.” Maj. Op. at 1115. I agree with the majority that in September, 1992, neither Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 , 110 S.Ct. 1028 , 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) nor any other case clearly established that Dr. Carter’s conduct violated Hogan’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Maj. Op. at 1115-1116.
I write separately to emphasize that this is the only holding of the ease. The conclusion that no ease had established the extent of the process to which Hogan was entitled under the circumstances, and therefore a person in Dr. Carter’s position surely could not have known of the process required, resolves the qualified immunity question presented in this appeal. Thus, there is no need to opine: (1) what a “reasonable jurist” would have “resorted to” in considering whether Dr. Carter’s conduct in fact violated Hogan’s rights, Maj. Op. at 1117, 1118; (2) whether our opinion in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 , 110 S.Ct. 1317 , 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990), survives the Supreme Court’s Harper decision, Maj. Op. at 1118 (particularly in view of the majority’s initial conclusion that caselaw involving “non-emergency” situations had no bearing on Dr. Carter’s right to qualified immunity, Maj. Op. at 1116); or (3) whether it is “not unlikely” that if Hogan had been afforded the hearing to which the district court held he was entitled, “Dr. Carter would now be facing a lawsuit by Hogan claiming that he [Dr. Carter] was deliberately indifferent to his [Hogan’s] serious medical needs.” Maj. Op. at 1118. The discussion of these issues is unnecessary for the decision in this case and, as such, is mere dictum.
K.K. HALL, MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and MICHAEL, JJ., join in this opinion.