finding that once officer legitimately saw barrel of gun sticking out from under seat of lawfully stopped vehicle, he could lawfully seize gun without warrant under “plain-view” doctrine
How later courts described this case
- finding that once officer legitimately saw barrel of gun sticking out from under seat of lawfully stopped vehicle, he could lawfully seize gun without warrant under “plain-view” doctrine
- finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible
- permitting the warrantless seizure of a gun from a locked car, where that gun was seen in plain view by the seizing officer
- “Once the officer saw the barrel of a gun sticking out from under the seat, and given Mr. Weatherspoon’s explanation *474 of why it was there[ — that he was looking for someone who had stolen property from him — ], it was not unreasonable for the officer to seize the weapon without a warrant.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
After examining the merits of this appeal, I find no quarrel with the result reached by the majority in this ease. Yet I am troubled by' the utter lack of professionalism on the part of the officers in this case. It is clear from the facts that the officers employed every conceivable method to gain access to Weatherspoon’s car. They could have better spent their time,'however, obtaining a search warrant. The fact that they ignored this option is what troubles me the most.
The Supreme Court has long held that “[a]s a general rule, [the Fourth Amendment] has required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a search is made.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). It follows that in cases involving automobile searches, “[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment, only, the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the ‘lesser’ intrusion [of immo *700 bilization] is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the ‘greater’ [intrusion of a search].” Id. Therefore, the various Fourth Amendment exceptions notwithstanding, Chambers teaches us that if it is possible to obtain a warranty then the government should make every effort to do so. Id.
The officers’ disregard of that lesson indicates that they viewed the rule favoring warrants as the exception. The facts of this case demonstrate that it is not likely that Weath-erspoon or anyone else could have moved the car or disposed of the incriminating evidence inside the car during the time that it would have taken the .deputies to get a search warrant. The car was totally immobile because the keys were locked inside it, and entrance into the passenger cabin was impossible. The officers spent an inordinate amount of time searching for ways to get into the car, when they could have spent that time attempting to obtain a warrant. The fact that their conduct is justified under “plain view” exception, see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (cited in Maj. Op. at 699), makes it no less disturbing.
The courts have established certain exceptions to the mandate of the Fourth Amendment in cases involving automobiles, and rightfully so. Those engaged in the enforcement of laws, however, should be reluctant to invoke those exceptions when there exists a legitimate opportunity to secure a warrant; likewise, the reviewing courts should be reluctant to uphold such decisions. In future cases, this court would do well to remember the words of Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 535 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) 1 :
It may be that [the search] is the most obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.... It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
. Quoted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).