affirming dismissal of legal malpractice claim under Ohio law; holding that representation for the “particular transaction” at issue ended in December 1986, despite the fact that the law firm continued to represent the company on other issues
How later courts described this case
- affirming dismissal of legal malpractice claim under Ohio law; holding that representation for the “particular transaction” at issue ended in December 1986, despite the fact that the law firm continued to represent the company on other issues
- holding that “continued general representation” does not toll the statute of limitations
- applying Ohio law and looking to whether evidence showed that plaintiff had constructive knowledge of accrual
- “Ohio law requires only ‘constructive knowledge of facts, rather than actual knowledge of their legal significance ... to start the statute of limitations running.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MILBURN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In concluding that First Savings knew or should have known that it had been injured by Alexander when it surrendered its legal claims against Troop in December 1986, the majority relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Flowers v. Walker, 63 Ohio St.3d 546 , 589 N.E.2d 1284 (1992). However, the majority fails to recognize that in Flowers , an external event triggered the plaintiffs awareness of her injury and her need to investigate the possibility of a medical malpractice action. When Mrs. Flowers was diagnosed with breast cancer, she received a signal that her doctor’s advice regarding her mammogram might have been unreliable. In contrast, in this case, no external event suggested that First Savings should investigate Alexander’s advice when it knowingly gave up its claims against Troop. At that time, First Savings relied on Alexander’s advice that there was no cause of action worth pursuing, and no event caused it to believe that Alexander’s advice was unreliable. Thus, in contrast to the majority’s view, First Savings could not and reasonably should not have known that it had been injured. By surrendering potential claims on Alexander’s advice, First Savings merely acted as any client would in making a decision in reliance on its attorney. The fact that in this case the advice led First Savings to abandon a possible legal action against Troop is not sufficient to distinguish this case from any other action for legal malpractice.
Requiring that an external event trigger a plaintiff to investigate a potential malpractice action is consistent with other Ohio malpractice cases. See Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter and Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54 , 538 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1989) (in legal malpractice action, cognizable event occurred when trial court invalidated plaintiffs antenuptial agreement); Koch v. Gross, 64 Ohio App.3d 582 , 582 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1990) (holding that cognizable event occurred when the plaintiff was advised of the legal malpractice by her new attorney); Herr v. Robinson Memorial Hosp., 49 Ohio St.3d 6 , 550 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1990) (cognizable event occurred when new doctor informed the plaintiff that he previously had been misdiagnosed); Tober v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 79 Ohio App.3d 333 , 607 N.E.2d 469,473 (1992) (same).
Therefore, I would hold that no cognizable event occurred when First Savings surren *1111 dered its claims against Troop in December 1986, and I would reverse the district court’s order granting defendant Buckingham, Doolittle’s motion for summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for a determination of the date on which plaintiffs cause of action accrued.