explaining that the statute “emphasizes the importance of preserving the confidentiality of patient records in order to encourage individuals to seek treatment”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the statute “emphasizes the importance of preserving the confidentiality of patient records in order to encourage individuals to seek treatment”
- explaining that the Supreme Court has “clarified that ... the focal point [of the analysis] is Congress’s intent in enacting the statute”
- affirming dismissal of a claim under a statute that lacked a private right of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
- describing courts as “especially reluctant” to imply additional remedies in a statute that expressly provides a remedy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring separately.
I concur in the result reached in my brother’s opinion but not for the reasons stated.
In my judgment, plaintiff Ellison does not have an implied cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 either directly or through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Ellison is not a member of the class of persons “ ‘for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.’” Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 , 36 S.Ct. 482, 484 , 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916)).
The language of § 290dd-2 strongly suggests that the statute’s broad purpose is to combat, in a number of ways, this nation’s crippling drug abuse problem and to do so primarily by encouraging addicts to seek treatment voluntarily. The House and Senate passed different versions of the bill that ultimately became the statute, and a House/Senate conference committee produced the version that was enacted into law. The conference committee adopted that portion of the Senate bill that contained a provision for confidentiality of patient records and later became § 290ee-3(a). The conference committee stated:
The conferees wish to stress their conviction that the strictest adherence to the provisions of this section is absolutely essential to the success of all drug abuse prevention programs. Every patient and former patient must be assured that his right to privacy will be protected. Without that assurance, fear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of records that will attach for life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment they must have if this tragic national problem is to be overcome.
Every person having control over or access to patients’ records must understand that disclosure is permitted only under the circumstances and conditions set forth in this section. Records are not to be made available to investigators for the purpose of law enforcement or for any other private or public purpose or in any manner not specified in this section.
H.R.Rep. No. 775, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (emphasis added).
This language suggests that the committee intended to protect the privacy of medical records in an attempt to encourage addicts to seek treatment for their drug abuse. Certainly nothing in this report, and nothing in the statute subsequently enacted, indicates that Congress intended that there be a private cause of action for the violation of the confidentiality requirement. We know, of course, that Congress’ silence is not disposi-tive. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 , 108 S.Ct. 513, 516 , 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988).
Thompson stands as the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance regarding implied causes of action. The Court emphasized that the “focal point” of a court’s inquiry must be “Congress’ intent in enacting the statute.” Id. The Court made clear that congressional intent need not be explicit and that courts should use the four factors from Cort v. Ash to determine whether Congress intended a private remedy for a violation of the statute.
The court today concludes that the Cort analysis suggests that we should not infer a private remedy for violation of § 290dd-2. I believe that the Cort factors strongly suggest that inferring a private cause of action is reasonable. However, I think it is unnecessary to reach this ultimate issue because whether or not we should infer a private remedy for some other plaintiff, we should not do so for Ellison. The first Cort factor requires that the plaintiff be “‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ ” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. at 2088 , and Ellison is not.
In my judgment, the class for whose “especial benefit” § 290dd-2 was enacted compris *473 es persons who voluntarily seek treatment for their drug abuse. It is not disputed that Ellison is not such a person. He received treatment only after he was forcefully taken to a hospital under court order after it was discovered that he was suffering from hallucinations from drug abuse, a situation which posed a serious threat to his own and the public’s safety because, at the time, he was working as a Cocke County ambulance driver. Stated otherwise, Ellison was part of the problem Congress wanted to remedy rather than a person for whom Congress intended to create an “especial benefit.”
For these reasons, I concur in affirming the judgment of the district court.