finding that the plaintiff adequately stated a claim under the Hindrance Clause because, inter alia, the plaintiff had alleged several incidents involving state authorities, including that the defendants had prompted a false arrest and that they had asserted “improper influence” over the New York Police Department
How later courts described this case
- finding that the plaintiff adequately stated a claim under the Hindrance Clause because, inter alia, the plaintiff had alleged several incidents involving state authorities, including that the defendants had prompted a false arrest and that they had asserted “improper influence” over the New York Police Department
- finding allegations that Defendants negotiated with police to alter police conduct to aid in the achievement of defendants' goal to block abortion clinics was sufficient to establish a hindrance
- noting that case law is sparse because “it is relatively rare” for an 9 ALJ to deny a claim at step two
- conspiracy to prevent or hinder state law enforcement officers from securing constitutional right to abortion is actionable under Sec. 1985(3)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TROTT, Circuit Judge
concurring and dissenting:
With four apparent votes on one side of the “hindrance” or “prevention” clause issue, and four on the other (albeit supported by dissonant reasoning), we do face a practical dilemma caused by a new justice on the court who has yet to be heard on this contentious issue. The dilemma, however, simply requires us to use our best efforts to analyze this clause of the statute in the light of its plain language and applicable precedents as we do our best to render a proper decision in this case. After considerable study, and with respect and appreciation for the thoughtful work done by Judge Hug, it is my opinion that Justice Scalia’s “hindrance” clause analysis in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 753 , 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) is persuasive. My conclusion in this regard rests not only on the analytical views expressed by Justice Scalia and four of his colleagues, but also on my belief that it is inappropriate for a court of appeals judge essentially to write off Griffin *688 v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 , 91 S.Ct. 1790 , 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) and Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 3352 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). Justice Souter has that prerogative, but I do not. Thus, I am persuaded (1) that the words “equal protection” in both clauses of the statute have the same meaning, and that these words as interpreted by the Court currently require proof of a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus to create a viable cause of action under either clause, and (2) that it must also be demonstrated that the conspiracy was “aimed at interfering with rights” that are “protected against private, as well as official encroachment.” Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833 , 103 S.Ct. at 3359 . I will not elaborate further, however, because an already well-informed Supreme Court will surely decide this issue in short order.
Justice Kennedy also makes some worthy points. He points to the dissenters’ inability “to agree on a single rationale” as a reason to distrust their conclusions, Bray , 506 U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 766 , and he correctly notes that “a false step in interpreting § 1985(3) risks making a whole category of ordinary state crimes a concurrent violation of a single congressional statute passed more than a century ago.” Id.
Thus, I concur in Judge Hug’s opinion holding that Bray forecloses the plaintiffs’ claims under the first clause of section 1985(3), but I respectfully dissent with regard to his holding that they have stated a cause of action under the second clause of that statute.