holding that the defendant’s design and manufacture of vehicles “unquestionably were acts connected to warranted if no plausible inferences can be drawn from the facts alleged that, if proven, would provide grounds for relief.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the defendant’s design and manufacture of vehicles “unquestionably were acts connected to warranted if no plausible inferences can be drawn from the facts alleged that, if proven, would provide grounds for relief.”
- holding that a complaint that alleged that the plaintiff suffered injuries in an automobile accident as a result of the defendant’s negligent design and manufacture of the vehicle satisfied the direct effect test
- referring to Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I do agree ... with the Court’s conclusion ... that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi in this case would not comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ”) (citation omitted)
- finding that jurisdiction was consistent with the “more stringent ‘stream of commerce plus’ analysis” without “determin[ing] which standard actually control[led] [the] case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the decision of the court, but would cast it in somewhat different terms. This panel previously rendered an opinion on July 9, 1992 reversing the district court, Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 965 F.2d 1014 , amended by, 975 F.2d 746 (11th Cir.1992). On December 28, 1992, more than six months thereafter, appellee, Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault U.S.A., Inc. (“RNUR”), having apparently employed another firm of attorneys, has filed a “Motion to Vacate Order,” asserting for the first time that, as a French government-owned corporation, it is a “foreign state” for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 , 1604-08, and is not a “citizen” or “subject” of a foreign state for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governing diversity of citizenship. RNUR had asserted in the district court and in this court only that the federal court lacked jurisdiction based upon § 1332 and the Georgia long-arm statute. It did not assert any lack of jurisdiction based upon immunity.
In denying the motion to vacate our order reversing the district court’s decision based on the minimum contacts required for diversity jurisdiction, I would hold four things: First, I would hold that RNUR has waived any ground of jurisdiction not initially asserted in the district court. Although sovereign immunity goes to subject matter jurisdiction, which normally cannot be waived and is noticeable by a court at any stage of the litigation, the unique jurisdictional grant provided for in the FSIA allows a foreign state, by waiving its immunity, to waive what would otherwise be a defect in subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court. Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compañía de Acero Del Pacifico S.A., 528 F.Supp. 1337 (D.C.N.Y.1982), affirmed on other grounds, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1984). Personal jurisdiction can, of course, always be waived and I would hold RNUR has waived any ground of personal jurisdiction not submitted to the district court or argued on appeal. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703-05 , 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104-05 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).
Second, I concur in the court’s opinion that, although federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist on the basis of diversity of citizenship, federal jurisdiction does exist in this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 (a) and 1605(a)(2).
*1554 Third, I would hold, as the court does, that the minimum contacts test under the due process clause of the Constitution and the Georgia long-arm statute, although that statute is not applicable in this case, is essentially the same test that a court should apply under the long-arm statute in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Thus the decision of the district court and the prior decision of this court which reversed, applied the correct test. Therefore, all that the district court said and all that we said regarding the contacts of RNUR with the forum state would be equally applicable under the FSIA long-arm statute. Thus there is no need to remand this case to the district court for its consideration under the proper statute, as requested by RNUR. We need not decide the wider issue as to whether contacts elsewhere in the United States would be sufficient in this case, since the issue as presented to the district court and this court was based on contacts with Georgia, the forum state.
Fourth, I fully concur in the court’s opinion that RNUR had sufficient contacts with the United States and Georgia to satisfy the requirements of the FSIA long-arm statute and the due process requirements of the Constitution.