holding that “crime of violence” for pur poses of 18 U.S.C. § 16 covers crimes in which the perpetrator “recklessly risks having to commit a specific intent crime” involving force but not “pure” recklessness offenses that do not imply such intent or willingness to use force
How later courts described this case
- holding that “crime of violence” for pur poses of 18 U.S.C. § 16 covers crimes in which the perpetrator “recklessly risks having to commit a specific intent crime” involving force but not “pure” recklessness offenses that do not imply such intent or willingness to use force
- holding that defendant's conviction for reckless endangering was a crime of violence under the second prong of the career offender guideline, § 4B1.2(a)(2), because the second prong of that guideline focuses on conduct rather than intent to use force
- recognizing in dicta that “crimes such as drunk driving ... present a serious risk of physical harm to a victim and therefore qualify as predicate ‘crimes of violence’ for purposes of the career offender Guideline”
- concluding that the Sentencing Commission has the power to expand the category of "career offenders” from the definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)
See United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 867 (3d Cir. 1992) abrogated on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008).
The opinion
ALITO, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the court’s opinion. In doing so, I express no view on the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, I fully agree that the broad definition of a “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) merits reexamination by the Sentencing Commission.