stating that res judicata “ ‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding’ ” (quoting Peugeot Motors of Am. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir.1989))
How later courts described this case
- stating that res judicata “ ‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding’ ” (quoting Peugeot Motors of Am. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir.1989))
- holding that "[r]es judicata precludes the assertion of a claim after a judgment on the merits in a prior suit by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action"
- providing that “res judicata does not bar claims that do not exist at the time of the prior litigation” and finding that a claim did not exist at the time of a previous suit and was therefore not barred
- stating that the “party invoking res judicata must establish” the elements
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe this case should be decided strictly on res judicata grounds, I respectfully dissent.
This action is barred by res judicata because the damages awarded by the district court could have been sought and awarded in Dement. The district court held, and the majority agrees, that front-pay damages would have been denied to the plaintiffs in their earlier action because they would have been speculative at that time. I fail to perceive how front-pay damages were any more speculative at that time than they are now.
The district court stated that plaintiffs could not have been certain that the union would continue to refuse to seek to add them to the agreement after judgment was entered, and that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that the union would respond to the court’s order entered against it on February 9, 1989, by attempting to add them to the Crew Consist Agreement. A “reasonable belief” that an accrued claim need not be asserted, however, cannot prevent its preclusion through the operation of res judicata.
Furthermore, the certainty of damages does not determine whether res judicata applies. “The rule of claim preclusion ... asks only if a claim made in the second action involves a right arising out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions that gave rise to the claims in the first action.... Claims may arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions even if they involve different harms or different theories or measures of relief.” Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir.1986). The claim for damages in this action certainly involves a right arising out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions that gave rise to the claims in the first action; therefore, the claim should have been brought then, and the claim is now precluded.
*1059 The district court in Dement declined to enter injunctive relief because the employer, RF & P, had been dismissed and had not been joined as an indispensable party. RF & P is not a party to this action either, yet the district court ordered monthly damages against the union in lieu of an injunction. The Dement court could have ordered the UTU to use its best efforts to effect a change in the agreement. An injunction compelling the UTU to seek amendment to the agreement simply does not require the employer’s presence in the action. The union could always seek to dissolve the injunction by demonstrating to the court that it had made a reasonable effort to have the agreement amended. Damages in lieu of an injunction, as awarded by the district court below, certainly could have been ordered in Dement as well; therefore, they are precluded in this action.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.