holding that an officer’s actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where he “enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat” before shortly thereafter shooting the plaintiff
How later courts described this case
- holding that an officer’s actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where he “enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat” before shortly thereafter shooting the plaintiff
- holding that a plainclothes officer who fired his gun after entering a dark hallway in a private residence at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as police, wearing his police hat, or shining his flashlight was “more than merely negligent”
- finding “considerable support in the record” for the view defendant employed the qualified immunity defense and privilege of an interlocutory appeal in a dilatory fashion where he raised the defense “a full five years” after the complaint was filed and days before the trial was set to commence, after the plaintiff had engaged in “extensive discovery”
- concluding in a § 1983 excessive-force case that the two versions of a police shooting presented a classic factual dispute and that the reasonableness of the shooting was a jury question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOINER, Senior District Judge,
concurring.
I concur, but would hold that the failure to raise the question of qualified immunity until two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin was clearly calculated to delay the trial and therefore waived the right to appeal. I do not believe that the Supreme Court would allow the procedure outlined in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), which was designed to obtain an early determination of the issue of qualified immunity, to be turned into a vehicle of delay as a result of Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). I believe that the theory of Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. Hanton v. Kennedy, 479 U.S. 1103 , 107 S.Ct. 1334 , 94 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), and the thoughtful discussion of this problem by Judge Easter- *451 brook in Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.1989), and Abel v. Miller, 904 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.1990), support this result.