holding that an officer’s actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where he “enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat” before shortly thereafter shooting the plaintiff
How later courts described this case
- holding that an officer’s actions were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where he “enter[ed] the dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat” before shortly thereafter shooting the plaintiff
- holding that a plainclothes officer who fired his gun after entering a dark hallway in a private residence at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as police, wearing his police hat, or shining his flashlight was “more than merely negligent”
- finding “considerable support in the record” for the view defendant employed the qualified immunity defense and privilege of an interlocutory appeal in a dilatory fashion where he raised the defense “a full five years” after the complaint was filed and days before the trial was set to commence, after the plaintiff had engaged in “extensive discovery”
- concluding in a § 1983 excessive-force case that the two versions of a police shooting presented a classic factual dispute and that the reasonableness of the shooting was a jury question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case but write separately because I disagree with the majority’s reasoning on the qualified immunity issue. The majority states that “[i]t was not ‘objectively reasonable’ for Currie to enter a dark hallway at 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself as a police officer, without shining a flashlight, and without wearing his hat.” From these facts the majority concludes that “because the right Officer Currie is alleged to have violated was clearly established, and because Officer Currie’s actions preceding the shooting were not those of an objectively reasonable police officer, we conclude that qualified immunity is not appropriate.”
*450 First, the majority neglects to include that in addition to receiving a call regarding a disturbance on the street in front of 1370 E. 91st Street, and upon arrival, hearing shouting and threatening language coming from inside the house; the officers observed a male break into and enter the house. The officers ran up the steps behind the male. Officer Currie’s partner returned to the police car to call for a backup, and Officer Currie entered the hallway. Under this more complete set of facts I am not so sure that it can be concluded as a matter of law that the officer’s actions were “not those of an objectively reasonable police officer” since they might have been justified as a “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement and were therefore not in violation of law at all even if the officer’s beliefs were mistaken.
Secondly, and more importantly, I believe the majority errs in lumping together conduct which was allegedly a fourth amendment violation for a warrantless search, which is not an issue in this case; with conduct giving rise to a fourth amendment excessive force claim, which is at issue. I do not think it automatically follows that even if an officer’s conduct was legally objectively unreasonable with respect to a search, he cannot under any circumstances acquire qualified immunity for a subsequent constitutional violation.
This having been said, I agree that Officer Currie was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because I believe generally, and in this case as well, that qualified immunity is not available in excessive force cases. It is well-established, and it was when the incident in question occurred, that an officer’s use of excessive force may rise to the level of an actionable constitutional deprivation. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Thus, “[t]he only knowledge that the officer[] needed was the knowledge that excessive force was not permitted.” Stickney v. Trikes, 909 F.2d 1485 (6th Cir.1990).
It seems to this writer that qualified immunity has no relevance unless there is excessive force, for if there is no excessive force, the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner under the circumstances and there is no constitutional violation. It also seems that once you have determined the need for the defense of excessive force, it seems as a matter of law that the officer has acted unreasonably; and has violated clearly established law. This is not to say that qualified immunity will never be available under any circumstances in excessive force cases; and in fact, the Supreme Court has intimated that such a defense may in some instances be available. 1 For the most part, however, because an officer is equipped with all the knowledge he needs regarding the use of excessive force, the only determination left to be made is whether the conduct was excessive under the circumstances.
. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 1873 n. 12, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ("Similarly, the officer's objective ‘good faith’ — that is, whether he could reasonably have believed that the force used did not violate the fourth amendment — may be relevant to the availability of the qualified immunity defense to monetary liability under § 1983”). As noted by the majority, the Supreme Court did not address the issue, however, since the defense had not been raised in that case.