stating, "It is the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons that invokes the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause, even though other black jurors are impanelled."
How later courts described this case
- stating, "It is the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons that invokes the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause, even though other black jurors are impanelled."
- holding that age is a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike
- describing the defendant’s affidavit as representing “paucity” of evidence in light of the presumption of a valid conviction despite the fact there was no transcript recording the proceeding
- “Contrary to the [defendant’s] assertion, once the government has shown that a defendant has three prior violent felony convictions pursuant to § 924(e)(1), ‘the burden rests with the defendant to show that the conviction was unconstitutional.’” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I defer to the view of the district judge who observed the three challenged jurors in serious question here (Kirk, Armstrong and Miller), I write separately to note what may be a significant deficiency in the statement of reasons for these- three peremptory strikes. Unless we are to assume that youth and unemployment are universally plausible reasons for jury strikes, there should be some indication of a nexus between the crime charged and the characteristics of the challenged jurors. Peremptory strikes can still be pre-textual if the prosecutor’s reasons do not relate to an articulable concern about potential jury sympathy. The cases cited to support the thesis that youth and unemployment are acceptable grounds for per *868 emptory strikes relate these characteristics to the subject of the trial. In United States v. McCoy, 848 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir.1988), the panel thought that unemployment may create sympathy with a defendant charged with bank robbery. In United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 , 109 S.Ct. 97 , 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988), striking young, single jurors was found “logical in the context of a narcotics prosecution.” In United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138, 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944 , 109 S.Ct. 371 , 102 L.Ed.2d 360 (1988), the panel found it reasonable for a prosecutor to want educated, employed jurors for a bank robbery trial. In the case before us the charge is possession of a gun by a convicted felon. No reason has been advanced why youth or lack of a job should affect the impartiality of jurors with respect to this offense. Although I accept the district court’s evaluation here, a nexus should ordinarily be a significant part of the rationale.