stating that “findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal” (quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal” (quotation marks omitted)
- noting that the doctrine “does not - bar consideration of matters that could have been, but were not, resolved in earlier proceedings”
- “[A] summary denial of rehearing en banc is insufficient to confer any implication or inference regarding the court’s opinion relative to the merits of a case.... We also believe that attaching prece-dential weight to a denial of rehearing en banc would be unmanageable.”
- “Adherence to the law of the case decrees that the findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority states that the purpose of the law of the case doctrine “is to establish efficiency, finality, and obedience within the judicial system.” Majority opinion at page 621. With the filing of the majority opinion in this case, “efficiency, finality, and obedience within [the Eleventh Circuit]” become meaningless utterances. According to the majority, one judge of the en banc court may (1) dissent from the court’s refusal to grant en banc rehearing on is *623 sues decided by the district court and a panel of this court, (2) write on a new self-created theory, not pleaded, not ruled on, not discussed, and (3) thereby nullify the actions of the parties, the district court, the panel, and the en banc court.
In the simplest terms, the majority holds that a judge on the en banc court, may not only review the district court’s rulings and the panel’s holdings, but, acting alone, may from the reviewed case give birth to a new case, based on grounds never thought of by the parties.
For the additional reasons stated in my dissent in Harris v. Luckey, 918 F.2d 888 (11th Cir.1990) (Luckey III), I continue to dissent.