“We respect the Church’s objections to the workers’ compensation system and its remarkable devotion to its religious beliefs in every .aspect of life. Where such beliefs clash with important state interests in the welfare of others, however, accommodation is not constitutionally mandated.”
How later courts described this case
- “We respect the Church’s objections to the workers’ compensation system and its remarkable devotion to its religious beliefs in every .aspect of life. Where such beliefs clash with important state interests in the welfare of others, however, accommodation is not constitutionally mandated.”
- applying Lee and upholding state requirement of mandatory participation in worker’s compensation program
- “We respect the Church’s objections to the workers’ compensation system and its remarkable devotion to 13 (...continued) debtor’s avoidable transfers in bankruptcy proceeding
- "[T]he Supreme Court now appears to have confined the applicability of those words to the rather limited field of unemployment compensation. . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1212 WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the reasoning and rationale of Judge Engel’s opinion. This is a close and troubling case with respect to whether there are any less “restrictive means” to provide workers’ compensation coverage for church-related employees than Ohio has taken. Plaintiff has demonstrated none in my view. It may be logical to assume, as argued by plaintiff, that the risk of injury in church-related jobs is less than in business and industry generally, but presumably the Ohio rate system gives a lower rate to those employers with fewer claims. It is a policy decision for the state to permit reasonable exemptions or exceptions from coverage.
Plaintiff has submitted affidavits that it operates a school or academy in conjunction with the church, which Robert B. Woodard, the school’s principal, has said is a part of “the Church’s day school ministry.” We do not know whether employees and teachers in this school are considered “church” employees, but Woodard also serves as a “pastor to the deaf.” Deborah Miller, another affiant, says she is a teacher in the academy, a church member, as well as a part of the church’s “county home ministry,” and has been a part of its “college ministry.” Ms. Miller says also that she is “a part of [the plaintiff church’s] staff.” We have reason, then, to believe that plaintiff operates with a staff larger than might be expected in the usual rural Ohio church.
Ohio’s Director of the Actuarial Department submitted an affidavit also indicating that the state has taken in some $39,000,-000 in premiums from the “classification that covers religious organizations such as churches” from 1982 to 1985. During that same period “the State incurred liability” of some $59,000,000 “in compensation and benefits to those injured workers of employers,” such as plaintiff. This data indicates a substantial deficit in premiums necessary to cover workers’ compensation benefits to church (and related entity) employees. This data demonstrates a strong need that all church employers be included among all other covered employers as premium payers to help with this deficit. (The system as a whole has accumulated a deficit exceeding one billion dollars as of December 31, 1985.)
In addition, Ohio does have a provision in its workers’ compensation laws that allows qualified employers to be self-insurers, thus avoiding some of the burdens of reporting to the state as covered employers. There is no indication that this particular church, nor that Christian churches as a class, has been treated differently under the Ohio law than other like employers or any other religious group. Plaintiff apparently did not choose to pursue this option.
I join, therefore, in affirming the district court decision.