holding that federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims of spouse of section 1983 plaintiff provided the state-law claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the section 1983 claims
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims of spouse of section 1983 plaintiff provided the state-law claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the section 1983 claims
- holding that federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims of § 1983 plaintiff’s spouse, provided the claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the section 1983 claims
- affirming $75,000 damages award in § 1983 case where plaintiff was illegally arrested and evidence included psychiatrist's testimony that plaintiff suffered from "a post traumatic stress disorder" involving "chest pains, headaches, insomnia, and recurrent invasive recalls or memories of the events"
- implying that federal courts retain jurisdiction over state law claims removed to federal court after federal claim allowing removal dismissed, although discretionary factors will usually lead court to remand or dismiss state claims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s petition for rehearing. Part III of the panel’s opinion approaches the question of pendent-party jurisdiction in terms of a new, unprecedented analytic modality — a modality which I find at material variance with the teachings of the Court. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-19 , 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2420-23 , 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). Joinder of claims, not joinder of parties, is the object of pendent jurisdiction. The doctrine was not designed to allow a party without a federally cognizable claim to obtain access to a federal forum by the simple expedient of joining forces with a different plaintiff asserting an independent claim, even one stemming from the same operative facts. That the two plaintiffs are spouses makes no difference, see, e.g., Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842 , 843 n.l (2d Cir.1965); nor does the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is in play, see, e.g., cases listed in Panel Op. at 16 n. 23.
In a nutshell, the claims of Jose Rodriguez and Irma Rodriguez are severable for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction and must be treated as such. The panel’s approach blurs this distinction, stretching both doctrine and application beyond permissible limits. For that reason, and consistent with the near-unanimous weight of authority, I would grant the instant petition in order to reconsider Part III of the panel’s opinion.