applying the rule of lenity after finding that the statute contained “language that is as amenable to one interpretation as the other,” with no clear legislative history or official interpretation
How later courts described this case
- applying the rule of lenity after finding that the statute contained “language that is as amenable to one interpretation as the other,” with no clear legislative history or official interpretation
- interpreting an ambiguous subsection of the Ethics in Government Act as requiring the government to demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge of the facts that made his conduct criminal
- applying the rule of lenity, as well as the canon that criminal offenses requiring no mens rea are generally disfavored, to resolve an ambiguous statute in the defendant’s favor
- reading Supreme Court precedents for the proposition that lobbying, "insofar as it constitutes self-representation,” is protected by the First Amendment right to petition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
with whom WALD, Chief Judge, MIKVA, and GINSBURG, RUTH B., Circuit Judges, concur,
concurring in the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc:
I think that the majority opinion in this case is clearly wrong; however, this is not a basis for en banc consideration by the court. Therefore, I concur in the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Any further consideration of this case must be pursuant to review by the Supreme Court.