recognizing that “the relevant event for purposes of analyzing [the defendant’s] culpability is the alleged constitutional injury, the guard’s opening of the letter outside [the prisoner’s] presence.”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “the relevant event for purposes of analyzing [the defendant’s] culpability is the alleged constitutional injury, the guard’s opening of the letter outside [the prisoner’s] presence.”
- holding that an officer's handling of an inmate's mail was at most negligent and, thus, did not reach the level of culpability necessary to permit a finding of personal liability under § 1983
- explaining that causation can be established by showing that the officer participated in the affirmative acts of another that, acting concurrently, resulted in a deprivation of federal rights
- holding that inadvertent opening of legal mail outside an inmate's presence, while not to be condoned, is not actionable as a constitutional violation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result and I concur in the opinion of Judge Price to the extent that it rests on the conclusion that Koskey’s conduct was no more than negligent and thus did not rise to the level of culpability required in section 1983 due process actions under Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 106 S.Ct. 662 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 , 106 S.Ct. 668 , 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). See also Rinker v. County of Napa, 831 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.1987). Although the majority opinion presents a strong argument on the difficult questions of proximate and intervening cause, I see no reason to reach the issues. The conclusion, shared by Judge Price and myself, that Koskey’s state of mind does not rise to the level necessary to support liability provides a sufficient basis for reversing the decision of the district court.