holding that equitable estoppel could be invoked against the government where the Army affirmatively misrepresented to defendant over a 14-year period that he was qualified for reenlistment despite an ongoing policy that homosexuality constituted a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment
How later courts described this case
- holding that equitable estoppel could be invoked against the government where the Army affirmatively misrepresented to defendant over a 14-year period that he was qualified for reenlistment despite an ongoing policy that homosexuality constituted a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment
- holding that the Army was estopped from denying a soldier’s pending reenlistment and issuing a discharge based on homosexuality, because the Army knew of soldier’s past admissions from official records and nevertheless enlisted him
- finding that the prong of suspectness inquiry is satisfied when the identifying trait is “so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]”
- stating that "any attempt to criminalize the status of an individual's sexual orientation would present grave constitutional problems"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANBY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur wholeheartedly in Judge Preger-son's majority opinion. My concurrence indicates no retreat, however, from my conviction that the Army’s discrimination against Watkins because of his homosexual orientation denies him equal protection of the laws. I joined Judge Norris’ eloquent opinion so holding in Watkins II, and I agree with everything Judge Norris says today on the equal protection point. Because we are en banc, and the constitutional issue is a recurring one, I think I may appropriately reach it even though equitable estoppel may dispose of the case.