holding that federal law imposes on colleges a “limited obligation to make reasonable accommodations to handicapped individuals,” and that, under the circumstances, “[w]aiver of a necessary requirement would have been a substantial rather than merely a reasonable accommodation”
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal law imposes on colleges a “limited obligation to make reasonable accommodations to handicapped individuals,” and that, under the circumstances, “[w]aiver of a necessary requirement would have been a substantial rather than merely a reasonable accommodation”
- finding that among the elements of a Section 504 claim is proof that plaintiff actually is “being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subject to discrimination” on the basis of his handicap
- holding that an education institution is not required to waive a course requirement deemed reasonably necessary for the conferral of an academic degree
- ruling that a Tennessee court would find an implied contract between a student and a private university
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit
Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority concerning Doherty’s misrepresentation and handicap discrimination claims, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the jury verdict in favor of Doherty on his contract claim.
My dissent flows from the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Southern as to Doherty’s breach of contract claim. Under Tennessee law, which we are required to apply to this state law claim, “[a] directed verdict should not be granted if there is any material evidence in the record that would support a verdict for the plaintiff....” Dewberry v. Maddox, 755 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tenn.App.1988) (emphasis added). See also Wharton Transport Co. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525-26 (Tenn.1980). Moreover, under Tennessee law, where the student possesses a reasonable belief that a college will not change its degree requirements as to him, and where the college should reasonably have expected the student to form such a belief, the student may maintain an action for breach of contract if the degree requirements are changed to his detriment. See Bales v. Lincoln Memorial University, slip op. (Tenn.App., Dec. 31, 1980). Cf. Peretti v. State of Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Mont.1979), rev’d on other grounds, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that the university/student relationship is contrac *580 tual in nature and that “[o]nly that which is reasonable may be implied” as a term of the contract).
In my view, the statements which Drs. Ebbers and Vasa made concerning Doherty’s ability to complete the optometry program at Southern constitute material evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that a contract existed between Doherty and Southern, and that Southern breached that contract. Since Drs. Ebbers and Vasa repeatedly indicated that Doherty’s handicap would not prevent him from completing the optometry program, the jury could reasonably have found (1) that Do-herty had a reasonable belief that no clinical proficiency requirements would be applied to him, and (2) that Southern should reasonably have expected Doherty to form such a belief. Since there existed sufficient evidence under Tennessee law to find in favor of Doherty on his contract claim, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the jury’s verdict.