reversing because the administrative law judge erroneously regarded a physician's opinion on causation as equivocal
How later courts described this case
- reversing because the administrative law judge erroneously regarded a physician's opinion on causation as equivocal
- noting with approval physician's statement that "shortness of breath can be a symptom of heart disease and . . .[claimant's] heart disease was not related to his coal mine employment"
- noting with approval physician’s statement that “shortness of breath can be a symptom of heart disease and ... [claimant’s] heart disease was not related to his coal miné employment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILL, Senior District Judge,
concurring.
I agree that, because the AU did not in his decision, as he should have, consider the medical opinions of Dr. Getty and Wilhel-mus on the ground that they were given three years before Helms’ blood gas studies, the case must be remanded for consideration of all the medical evidence. I write separately, however, because the majority opinion so strongly emphasizes the defendant’s evidence that it may be misunderstood as a peremptory direction to the AU to find for the defendant.
The statute is clear that if Helms’ undisputed total disability is “in whole or in part” a result of his coal mine employment or that, as we have said previously in Wetherill v. Director, OWCP, 812 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir.1987), pneumoconiosis was “a contributing cause” of his disability he is entitled to compensation under the Act.
We do not here decide that it was not. We do decide that the AU must make that determination in the light of all the medical evidence.