Opinion

Frances B. Smith v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a Body Politic

  • 853 F.2d 517
  • 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10808
  • 1988 WL 82203
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Jul 22, 1988
Status
Published
Author
Cudahy
On the bench
Bauer, Cudahy, Coffey
Cited by
20 cases

finding no property interest where personnel clerk employed by school board, who did not have the authority to bind the school board to a contract, told the employee she was a “certified” employee entitled to certain protections

How later courts described this case

  • finding no property interest where personnel clerk employed by school board, who did not have the authority to bind the school board to a contract, told the employee she was a “certified” employee entitled to certain protections
  • “To create a justifiable and reasonable expectation of job security, and thereby establish a property interest, there must be a mutually explicit understanding between the parties or a party with authority to bind the Board”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

I agree that the majority reaches the correct result through an analysis that responds to the somewhat unusual and opaque arguments of the parties. That this is a procedural due process case requiring the existence of a property interest seems clear. That we are dealing with a problem in substantive due process seems much less clear, although the plaintiff must, in any event, lose under a substantive due process analysis. The equal protection claim perhaps offers more promise than the others because of the apparent disparity in the treatment of “rapid advanc-ers” and those who linger to serve their required probation. This does not, however, seem to be quite the argument that the plaintiff makes.

Smith was the holder of what amounts to a “battlefield commission.” She advanced through the ranks so rapidly that she was never left in one place long enough to complete a probationary period. Under the rules she points to no deprivation which can be deemed of constitutional dimension. But the rules, even if constitutional in their application, seem clearly deficient in allowing this bizarre scenario to unfold. It is certainly not evident why, with each promotion, an employee receives no credit for probationary time already served, to be applied to some lower classification level.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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