holding that medical judgment contained in a noncomplying report may constitute substantial evidence of disability if it is reasoned and based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
How later courts described this case
- holding that medical judgment contained in a noncomplying report may constitute substantial evidence of disability if it is reasoned and based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
- finding “ambiguities and inconsistencies in the Director’s interpretation of ... regulations ... sufficiently great to preclude deference”
- “We therefore believe that even in the case of interpretations of regulations, we must distinguish MARSH V. J. ALEXANDER’S 65 between a position and a reasoned interpretation and defer only to the latter.” (emphasis added)
- reviewing courts need not defer to agency's interpretation of statute which arose only during adversary proceeding
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge,
joining and concurring:
I believe that Judge Becker’s discussion in Part III. A. of the majority opinion accurately describes Supreme Court precedent on the subject of judicial deference to agencies’ regulatory interpretations. I, therefore, fully join in the majority opinion. However, I share Judge Weis’ concern — so well expressed by him — that blind deference is not an adequate substitute for sound and impartial reasoning, and, therefore, agency interpretations should be viewed with caution and handled with care.