Opinion

Consolidation Coal Company v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Coal Employment Project, United Mine Workers of America, Intervenors

  • 824 F.2d 1071
  • 263 U.S. App. D.C. 91
  • 1987 CCH OSHD 27,986
  • 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9953
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jul 24, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Edwards
On the bench
Wald, Edwards, Ginsburg
Cited by
17 cases

holding that an agency designation that “became a part of [the regulated party’s] permanent record, thereby exposing [it] to more severe sanctions for later violations” supplied “the ‘modicum of injury’ necessary to support jurisdiction”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that an agency designation that “became a part of [the regulated party’s] permanent record, thereby exposing [it] to more severe sanctions for later violations” supplied “the ‘modicum of injury’ necessary to support jurisdiction”
  • concluding that the legislative history of the Mine Act “suggests that Congress intended all except ‘technical violations’ of mandatory standards to be considered significant and substantial”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:

I am pleased to concur, without any reservations, in the excellent opinion of Chief Judge Wald. I write only to emphasize the point that, under the ripeness doctrine, the hardship prong of the Abbott Laboratories test is not an independent requirement divorced from the consideration of the institutional interests of the court and agency. Better Government, which I authored, surely cannot reasonably be construed to suggest such a requirement. The precedent in this circuit is clear that a litigant must demonstrate “hardship” only when necessary to outweigh institutional interests that militate in favor of deferral of review.

Indeed, it would make no sense whatsoever to compel a litigant who has a valid case or controversy, cause of action, stand *1089 ing and proper jurisdiction to prove some sort of “hardship” before allowing the litigant to seek judicial review. Under such a rule, some litigants might forever be barred from seeking judicial review for want of a showing of “hardship.” The ripeness doctrine was never intended to produce such a principle. The dissent’s suggestion to the contrary is, in my view, flatly wrong.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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