holding that once a defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy has been established, “the defendant is deemed guilty of substantive acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by any of his criminal partners”
How later courts described this case
- holding that once a defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy has been established, “the defendant is deemed guilty of substantive acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by any of his criminal partners”
- noting that "the curative power of Miranda warnings may be given great weight in some situations,” so "we review repeated efforts to inform [a defendant] of his rights as a factor tending to support the conclusion that his statements ... were an act of free will” (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285)
- stating that a warrantless arrest for failure to carry proof of liability insurance under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 14.01(b) is lawful
- holding that there was no abuse of discretion because the Pinkerton instruction “expressed the Pinkerton principle at least as clearly” as prior decisions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with all aspects of the majority’s fine opinion except one — the reversal of the conviction of Ponce on the conspiracy count while affirming the conviction of Lopez on the conspiracy count. The evidence cited by the majority as implicating Ponce in the conspiracy, majority opinion at 1001-02 is exactly the same as that used to convict Lopez except for two factors. In Lopez’ case he inquired of the officers how they had discovered them, and when told how he did not act surprised. Also, when a news report of the van’s discovery came on the television, Lopez expressed an interest in it. The majority holds that these factors provided the “vital probative link between Lopez and the specific conspiracy offense with which he was charged,” and since these facts were not shown in the case against Ponce, he could not be convicted of conspiracy. I do not believe that these two factors, given all the other evidence tying Lopez and Ponce to the conspiracy, amount to a distinction that makes a difference.
The standard of review of a sufficiency of the evidence question is that we must view the evidence and inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and accept all credibility determinations, in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and then determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 935, 936 (5th Cir.1984), ce rt. denied, 473 U.S. 906 , 105 S.Ct. 3531 , 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985). I believe that under this standard of review Ponce’s conviction on the conspiracy count must be affirmed. Just because Ponce did not show any interest in the news report and did not make any statements as to how they were discovered is not a sufficient difference for this court on review to decide that a reasonable trier of fact could not find him guilty. Such a decision takes the fact finding out of the hands of the jury and places it in the control of an appellate court.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from this part of the majority’s opinion.