holding that a district court's rejection of liquidated damages in an age discrimination case was improper because it relied on factual findings "that conflicted with the jury's findings"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a district court's rejection of liquidated damages in an age discrimination case was improper because it relied on factual findings "that conflicted with the jury's findings"
- holding that liquidated damages under the ADEA are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the FSLA
- holding that liquidated damages under the ADEA are intended to punish and deter
- jury’s finding of intentional discrimination coupled with defendant’s knowledge that ADEA prohibited age discrimination precluded finding of good faith
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
VANCE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the opinion of the panel majority in all respects except as to the award of prejudgment interest, from which I dissent.
Congress has explicitly stated that amounts owing under the ADEA are deemed to be amounts owing under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b); O’Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, 748 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir.1984). It is settled that an award of both prejudgment interest and liquidated damages represents a double recovery under the FLSA. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 897 , 65 S.Ct. 895 , 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1944); Barcel-lona v. Tiffany English Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 469 (5th Cir.1979); Foremost Dairies v. Ivey, 204 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.1953). I can fathom no reason for treating the successful ADEA plaintiff differently from his FLSA counterpart with respect to liquidated damages and prejudgment interest.