stating that if instructions were sufficient. district court determines on remand that defendant did not breach cooperation agreement entered into with government, “fundamental fairness requires the government to uphold its part of the agreement and the district court may enforce the agreement.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that if instructions were sufficient. district court determines on remand that defendant did not breach cooperation agreement entered into with government, “fundamental fairness requires the government to uphold its part of the agreement and the district court may enforce the agreement.”
- stating that if district court determines on remand that defendant did not breach cooperation agreement entered into with government, "fundamental fairness requires the government to uphold its part of the agreement and the district court may enforce the agreement.”
- reversing district court’s ruling that government could not prosecute defendant for original offense because government had received benefits of defendant’s cooperation and remanding with instructions that if district court found defendant had breached agreement government is no longer bound by agreement not to prosecute
- holding that the Government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HANSON, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The Court today construes this as a simple breach of contract action, but fails to address the more grave concerns with regard to the enforceability of the contract. The contract term at issue would allow the government to void the contract at any point in the future if Brown would commit a crime punishable by a term in excess of one year. The agreement makes no mention of the applicable statute of limitations for the crime he committed in 1983. As a result of the ambiguity in the contract created by the government, I believe Brown would not be bound. At the time he signed the contract, Brown found himself in a totally subservient position to the government due to the fact that he was under the stress of the charge. It would appear to me that the government used its superior bargaining position to almost blackmail Brown into signing a contract committing him to being an informant for life. This term, it seems to me, would amount to an unconscionable bargain and therefore is void as against public policy. Furthermore, because Brown has fully performed the obligations he agreed to and because the government has received all the reasonable emoluments of its bargain, it cannot now force him into trial on the 1983 charges it agreed not to prosecute.
I find even more disturbing this Court’s failure to consider the serious repercus *356 sions that may ensue if the government is allowed to prosecute Brown. Armed with all the information it has from the confession, the government is asked not to rely directly or indirectly on that information. Even if I were not troubled by discerning how the court below will be able to ascertain when the government indirectly uses this information, I would question whether this Court’s decision forfeits Brown’s right against self incrimination. I have no doubt, in spite of the government’s assurances, that the information he has given will benefit the government in cross-examining witnesses and anticipating defenses. The end result is, even though Brown had performed his part of the bargain, that the government will be able to prosecute him with the very information he was assured would not be used against him.
The more just result in this case would be for the government to pursue its other remedies — prosecution for perjury or false statement (as provided in paragraph 2 of the agreement) and prosecution on the 1985 marijuana charges. I would therefore affirm the district court.