Nelda A. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. As I indicated in my dissent from the majority’s initial opinion, the Appeals Council’s decision is, in my view, supported by substantial evidence. See Parker v. Heckler, 763 F.2d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir.1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting). I also believe that the Appeals Council’s rejection of the AU’s credibility findings does in fact satisfy the requirements set forth in Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1519-1522 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc).

The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 , 86 S.Ct. 1018 , 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). Consequently, “an administrative agency’s decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.1984). I would affirm the district court’s decision because I feel that the Appeals Council’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. The statements in Parker’s application indicate that she cares for her personal needs, performs household chores, does the grocery shopping, and attends church regularly. Parker testified that she thought her medications caused her blurred vision and difficulty in standing. Doctor Todd, her treating physician, indicated that her medication also could be responsible for her malaise and fatigue. Although Dr. Todd stated that he thought she was “medically unable to work,” he also stated that “many of the objective studies [seem] normal.” Doctor Ayers, another treating physician, attributed her prolonged Apersoline treatment as the cause of her arthralgias and myalgias. Although Doctor Ayers noted that Parker *1182 had some tenderness and puffiness of the heel, he found no joint swelling or limitation of movement. In fact, Doctor Ayers concluded that her problem was primarily a local mechanical problem involving the heels.' Doctor Ayers prescribed heel cups and recommended injections to ease the pain. Parker testified, however, that she did not take the injections because the pain was not severe. The evidence merely establishes that she has several problems that may be caused by her medications. The Council adequately addressed and rejected the possibility that the side effects of the medication were disabling. Moreover, although the record indicates that Parker has hypertension, no evidence of minimal end organ damage exists. See Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1985) (record supported a finding of severe impairment where the claimant suffered from hypertension with minimal end organ damage, in addition to several other impairments). Here, substantial evidence exists to support the Council’s decision, a decision to which we must ■ give deference.

I also believe that the Appeals Council properly rejected the AU’s credibility findings. The Council specifically addressed the issue of the side effects of her medication and concluded that the “low” and “routine” maintenance level doses of the medication caused only minimal side effects. Record at 8. Although the Council did not specifically address her employer’s testimony, that testimony merely corroborated Parker’s statements regarding the side effects. When the Council rejected her testimony concerning the side effects of the medication, it obviously rejected her employer’s testimony. See Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d at 1521 n. 11 (en banc) (“the reviewing court’s function is not frustrated if the Appeals Council’s implicit rejection and explanation are sufficiently clear”). The Council also implicitly discredited the testimony that she had to lie down for fifteen to twenty minutes every two to three hours when it concluded that her ability to perform her daily activities and her ability to care for herself were not significantly affected. Finally, the Council had “good cause” for discrediting Dr. Todd’s findings. The Council relied on SSR-82-55, which provided that hypertension without significant end organ damage is not a severe impairment. Although the current status of 82-55 is “[ojbsoleted without replacement,” it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary has taken the position that “minimal” end organ damage is sufficient. I am aware that in Flynn minimal end organ damage was sufficient; however, the medical evidence in that case was much stronger and the claimant suffered from several impairments, the cumulative effect of which resulted in a finding of severe impairment. Moreover, the record in this case does not support a finding of minimal end organ damage.

In conclusion, I would affirm the decision of the district court. The substantial evidence of the record supports the Appeals Council’s decision, and the Council’s credibility findings satisfy the requirements set forth in Parker v. Heckler (en banc).