awarding interest only from date of judgment on remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiff's right to money not established until appeal final, and trebling eliminates concern that plaintiff is not fully compensated for loss if does not receive interest for the time between verdict and judgment
How later courts described this case
- awarding interest only from date of judgment on remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiff's right to money not established until appeal final, and trebling eliminates concern that plaintiff is not fully compensated for loss if does not receive interest for the time between verdict and judgment
- exercising discretion and awarding interest only from date of judgment after remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiffs right to money was not established until appeal, and obligatory trebling eliminates concern for adequate compensation
- The court applied Fed.R.App.P. 37, which gives appellate courts discretion in allowing post-judgment interest when a judgment is modified or reversed. The court concluded that it was equitable to award post-judgment interest from the date of that court's mandate issued after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. The court reasoned that the conflicting rulings at various stages of the proceedings demonstrated that the plaintiffs' victory had been far from clear cut.
- federal court sitting in diversity must apply substantive law of the state regarding rate and accrual of interest on a judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge, with whom BROWN, JOHNSON, and JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:
“The established rule,” we said in Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Company of America, (Alcoa), 1 “is that computation of interest be made from the date judgment should properly have been entered for the plaintiffs.” The majority opinion correctly quotes this in footnote 10. Despite the reasons given by the majority, I would not overrule that decision. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
. 509 F.2d 784 , 789 (5th Cir). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975).