awarding interest only from date of judgment on remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiff's right to money not established until appeal final, and trebling eliminates concern that plaintiff is not fully compensated for loss if does not receive interest for the time between verdict and judgment
How later courts described this case
- awarding interest only from date of judgment on remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiff's right to money not established until appeal final, and trebling eliminates concern that plaintiff is not fully compensated for loss if does not receive interest for the time between verdict and judgment
- exercising discretion and awarding interest only from date of judgment after remand in antitrust case because case was weak, plaintiffs right to money was not established until appeal, and obligatory trebling eliminates concern for adequate compensation
- The court applied Fed.R.App.P. 37, which gives appellate courts discretion in allowing post-judgment interest when a judgment is modified or reversed. The court concluded that it was equitable to award post-judgment interest from the date of that court's mandate issued after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. The court reasoned that the conflicting rulings at various stages of the proceedings demonstrated that the plaintiffs' victory had been far from clear cut.
- federal court sitting in diversity must apply substantive law of the state regarding rate and accrual of interest on a judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment because I am persuaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to interest before entry of a judgment in its favor. But I am not persuaded that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 , which is *713 plain enough, allows us to do “equity.” Interest is simply compensation for the loss of use of money. The Congress has said that interest “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” Before that date, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to the money and is not entitled to be compensated for the loss of its use.
It is no answer to say that an “equitable” construction of the statute allows an award of interest running from the date when a judgment ought to have been entered. When we interpret indefinite language and are persuaded that the Congress intended to achieve a certain array of results, we may well have the authority to give full content to the congressional purpose and, in the process, call it “equitable.” This court’s reading of the statute and Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, however, simply claims the power to tack on interest whenever a majority of appellate judges think it fair to do so. We do not have the inherent authority to bestow gratuities on deserving plaintiffs, and I find nothing in the statute granting such a license. I would therefore follow the Second Circuit’s rule and deny interest.
I joined in upholding plaintiff’s verdict because I was persuaded that decisions of the Supreme Court required me to do so. If, however, we are to measure this claim for interest according to each judge’s equitable lights, I agree that an award is not appropriate. I am persuaded that the antitrust regulation of economic markets will not, in the end, become a standard tool for regulating state government. The answers for raw political deals are political, and the Sherman Act cannot be used to furnish those answers for long. In my view, this defendant was defeated on the merits because it passed through a time window of changing law rather than because it engaged in conduct that was malevolent by antitrust standards. There would be no equity in forcing it to pay a bonus to the plaintiff on top of the lawful award.