stating that “liability under § 1983 ‘may be predicated upon inadequate custodial care of an inmate who might harm himself,’ ” which is “ ‘an aspect of the broader constitutional duty to provide medical care for inmates’ ”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “liability under § 1983 ‘may be predicated upon inadequate custodial care of an inmate who might harm himself,’ ” which is “ ‘an aspect of the broader constitutional duty to provide medical care for inmates’ ”
- stating that a facility’s “deliberate and systematic lack of adequate care for detainees” is the “kind of arbitrariness and abuse of power that is preserved as a component of the due process clause in Daniels’’
- recognizing that “[a] pretrial detainee ... has a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from punishment altogether”
- finding deliberate indifference because defendants knew that decedent had attempted suicide in a previous confinement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
1. Hard as I may try, the words of the complaint do not lead me to the same conclusions as they do the majority. I think the majority, disregarding Justice O’Con-nor’s recent admonition in Whitley v. Albers, — U.S. —, —, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1086 , 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), has “effectively collapsed the distinction between mere negligence and wanton conduct.”
2. I believe the majority remands this case to the district court as an abstraction. Although the majority seems to say that the complaint alleges facts satisfying the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” standard, it also suggests, vaguely perhaps, that the plaintiff may be able to recover on a lesser standard at trial. The majority, however, like a humming bird darting about in a garden, never dwells long enough on any one suggestion to give the reader any idea what standard it has chosen or how such standard might be defined. Pity the poor district court that must instruct the jury using this opinion as guidance.
3. The majority construes City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 2427 , 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), beyond my recognition of that opinion when it suggests that Tuttle supports the complaint here. The plaintiffs here seek to impose liability by alleging that the charged officials and the City of Houston caused the death of their son through the “custom” or “policy” of failing to train police and jail personnel in suicide prevention or failing to establish other general procedures. Addressing the question whether a “policy” such as “failing to train” could support a section 1983 action, Tuttle expressed skepticism of, rather than support for, the view of the majority:
[E]ven assuming that such a “policy” would suffice, it is open to question whether a policymaker’s “gross negligence” in establishing police training practices could establish a “policy” that constitutes a “moving force” behind subsequent unconstitutional conduct, or whether a more conscious decision on the part of the policy maker would be required.
Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. at 2436 n. 7. Where, as here, the complaint alleges that the harm was caused by the deceased’s own hand, it is not possible to argue convincingly, at least to me, that any such general “policy” or “custom” such as “failure to train” could provide the moving force in the suicide of a detainee who tragically hanged himself with his own socks. The Supreme Court has expressed my concern: “The fact that a municipal ‘policy’ might lead to ‘police misconduct’ is hardly sufficient to satisfy Monell’s requirement that the particular policy by the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional violation.” Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. at 2436 n. 8 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, in Tuttle , Justice Rehnquist noted that
the word “policy” generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives; it is therefore difficult in one sense even to accept the submission that someone pursues a “policy” of “inadequate training,” unless evidence can be adduced which proves that the inadequacies resulted from conscious choice — that is, proof that the policy makers deliberately chose a training program which would prove inadequate.
Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. at 2436 . In this case it is contrary to common sense to believe that *1191 the City of Houston would deliberately have adopted a policy of inadequate supervision that would lead to strong likelihood of a detainee’s suicide.
4. I conclude by pointing out that I continue to adhere to each of the positions expressed in my prior dissent. Cases of prison suicides should not be decided under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); rather, these cases are more analogous to those involving a prisoner’s attack on a fellow prisoner. 751 F.2d 1458 -1459. The complaint here fails to make out a claim of “deliberate indifference,” and states at most a marginal claim of negligence. Id. at 1457-58. The majority opinion conflicts with our own precedent and imposes an impractical burden on the prisons. Id. at 1455-56. These points are explicated in my previous dissenting opinion.
For all of these reasons as well as those given above for differing with the majority’s revised opinion, I respectfully continue to dissent.