stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the *854 basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint
How later courts described this case
- stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the *854 basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint
- stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint
- recognizing that the affirmative defense of federal preemption can be the basis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
- recognizing that issue of preemption can be the basis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding that the Quiller contract does not qualify for protection under the Federal Preemption Statute. I agree with the Court that the thirty-day notice provision is not required to be in the contract. I cannot agree that the remedy applied here is suitable because of the language in the contract concerning the notice requirement.
When the contract is obviously drawn and intended by all parties to permit them to take advantage of the Federal Preemption Statute, it is unduly harsh to throw the whole contract out just because it contains language which appears to violate the thirty-day notice requirement. Rather than applying state usery laws to a contract which could not have been validly made thereunder, it would be more equitable to simply invalidate this contract clause to the extent it violates the consumer regulations, and enjoin enforcement if that remedy is deemed necessary to protect the consumer.
This result would further the twin aims of the Federal Preemption Act, assuring the availability of consumer credit for the purchase of manufactured housing and according protection to consumer borrowers, without interfering so unnecessarily with a carefully conceived financing program established to meet the needs of both parties in a time of rising money cost.