explaining that “Congress explicitly laid venue in FOIA cases in ‘the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia’ ”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Congress explicitly laid venue in FOIA cases in ‘the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia’ ”
- recognizing situations where “the government may be unable to divulge more information publicly without giving away the information it is trying to withhold”
- upholding in camera review 14 of a letter because “extensive public justification would threaten to reveal the very information for which a FOIA exemption is claimed”
- The index “enables the trial court to fulfill its duty of ruling on the applicability of the exemption, and it enables the adversary system to operate by giving the requester as much information as possible, on the basis of which he can present his case to the trial court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I dissent with respect to the majority’s treatment of the psychological report. In analyzing this case under the Freedom of Information Act, I find absolutely no material distinction between the psychological report and the Benoit letter. The majority cites no significant differences between these two documents and, yet, affirms as to one but not the other. I would affirm as to both documents.
The record in this matter clearly indicates that Lykins did not receive a list of claimed Freedom of Information Act exemptions as to either the psychological report or the Benoit letter. It is equally plain, however, that the contents of the public Marble affidavit adequately informed Lykins of the nature of the claimed FOIA exemptions, thus enabling him to litigate any issues raised by either document. Therefore, to the extent that the public affidavit was deficient at all, it was equally deficient as to both documents. Nonetheless, because Lykins had adequate notice of the Government’s proposed exemptions for both documents, and because, in any event, I can find no basis whatsoever for disclosure of the psychological report, I dissent from the decision to remand. The Government’s failure in this case to adhere to the strict technical requirements of a Vaughn Index was at worst harmless error. In my view, to remand under these circumstances is merely to engage in empty formality and to require an already overburdened District Court to do the same.