issuing a bargaining order in a Gissel I case is an abuse of discretion by the Board since this part of the Gissel decision was just dictum
How later courts described this case
- issuing a bargaining order in a Gissel I case is an abuse of discretion by the Board since this part of the Gissel decision was just dictum
- “ ‘[T]he introduction of evidence relevant to an issue already in the case .may not be used to show consent to trial of a new issue absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was attempting to raise a new issue.’ ”
- “Our national labor relations policy is designed to effectuat[e] ascertainable employee free choice and expressed majority sentiment”
- R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge,
separate concurring statement:
I note as a postscript to the many pages we have written that as a court of review we must wrestle with the “matters of high principle” aired in this case. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1769, 1794 (1983). The point has been made tellingly, however, that “[i]f the law is to have any chance of vindicating the employees’ group right to ‘bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,’ the [relief] it promises must come quickly.” Id. at 1793. We write as 1983 runs out about a unionization campaign that occurred in the spring and summer of 1977. The long delays at every stage of this and similar proceedings may indeed render the Board’s remedies, however stiff, “beside the point.” Id. at 1794 (footnote omitted).