holding that under Miranda, “evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the defendant had first been warned of his rights and knowingly waived those rights”
How later courts described this case
- holding that under Miranda, “evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the defendant had first been warned of his rights and knowingly waived those rights”
- rejecting defendant’s argument that his statement to “forget the whole thing” showed his hesitancy to engage in the criminal scheme because the statement appeared to have been made in frustration in response to a codefendant’s erratic behavior
- finding extrinsic evidence was properly admitted despite the absence of a limiting instruction due to the nature of the extrinsic evidence and the minimal prejudice resulting from its admission
- holding that a firefighter’s search of a sugar bowl exceeded the scope of the emergency, which was to fight the fire and locate its source
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part by Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986)
716 F.2d 810, 816, 821 (3d Cir.1983), abrogated in part by Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986).
The opinion
RONEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of Rendaro’s convictions and Parr’s convictions as to Counts I and III. I dissent from the reversal of Parr’s Count II conviction.
The Court finds a fourth amendment violation in the seizure by a fire fighter of currency discovered during a time when exigent circumstances legitimatized his entry of the building, his activity in extinguishing the fire, and his investigation as to *819 its cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). The Court refuses to extend the exigency exception to a seizure of currency for the purpose of protecting it for the owner. So far am I from the convoluted reasoning that brings the Court to this result, that I would think it unreasonable for the fire fighter not to make the rather cursory search that was made here and not to take possession of that which could be easily protected for the owner.
Once the seizure was made, the inventory of what was seized was clearly appropriate. It was during this inventory that the currency was revealed to be counterfeit. At that point, the fire fighter could not return it to the owner, but was obligated to turn the bills over to the police.
We give up too much to Mr. Parr when we give up the right to have our homes and possessions reasonably protected by firemen, who, it seems to me, are hired precisely for the purpose of protecting our belongings. This was not a search for criminal evidence long after the fire was extinguished. The motion to suppress was properly denied under Michigan v. Tyler, supra.
Parr claims that even if the bills were admissible, the evidence was insufficient to establish his intent to defraud under 18 U.S.C.A. § 472 . Parr’s co-defendant, Donna Oles, testified that Parr said he had a friend who had some friends that could make him some money if he could produce a good $10. Oles testified that Parr said the bills would be passed in dark places, and that people were taking them out of the country. The evidence establishes not only that Parr possessed the counterfeit bills, but intended to utilize them to defraud others. A general intent to defraud third parties is sufficient to sustain a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 472 . Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1960).
I would affirm.