The opinion
JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion, being of the view that it is inconsistent with the strong mandate of Congress expressed in the 1976 amendment to the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA).
Section 7 of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 232 altered the standards and criteria for determining release dates for youthful offenders. It specifically amended § 5017(a) of YCA, and mandated that the criteria of 18 U.S.C. § 4206 be applied to all youthful offenders. See footnote 8, majority opinion. Courts have uniformly held, and the majority agrees, that the 1976 amendment now directs the Parole Commission’s attention from rehabilitation considerations to an analysis of the seriousness of the offense committed in calculating a release date. Majority opinion at 1199-1200; Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440, 443-44 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Wallulatum, 600 F.2d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir.1979); Benites v. United States Parole Comm’n, 595 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir.1979). In so doing the plain Congressional purpose was to develop uniform standards and criteria for calculations of parole release dates for all federal prisoners. See S.Rep. No. 369 reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 335, 339 — 40, 350 (amendment is to equate and parallel release criteria for all federal prisoners without regard to means of sentencing); Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d at 443-44 .
Applying these new criteria, the Parole Commission analyzed the circumstances of Adams’ case, taking into account the seriousness of the crime committed and his past history, including the fact he had been sentenced under the YCA. As a result, it elected to apply its youth guidelines to Adams and set a presumptive release date. It left open the possibility of an earlier release date, by establishing an interim parole review in December, 1981 when another consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 4206 would occur. Overall the Parole Commission scrupulously applied all release criteria required by § 5017(a) and enumerated in § 4206.
The majority, however, would ignore the passage of the 1976 amendment and continue to require the Parole Commission to calculate release dates substantially on the offender’s response to treatment. Certainly, while the Parole Commission may consider such a factor, and, in this case arguably did, it is no longer required to do so. 1
*1203 In sum, the Parole Commission did consider appellant Adams’ response to treatment in this case, and treated him as a youthful offender, even though it was not required to do so. I therefore cannot concur in the majority’s opinion requiring the Parole Commission to reopen appellant’s parole hearing. 2 I would affirm the district court and deny the writ of habeas corpus.
. The Parole Commission provided for an interim parole review in December, 1981. It also conditioned Adams’ release on his successful completion of an alcoholic treatment program. The Commission implicitly included such considerations in its decision, within its discretion, to apply its youth guidelines rather than its adult guidelines under 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 .
. The majority suggests this interpretation of the 1976 amendment to YCA might pose serious constitutional issues. Since such issues were not raised in this case, however, it is premature to address them at this time.